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WITHOUT A CLUE AND STILL WITHOUT A MASTER PLAN:'
MUNICIPALITIES LEFT UNCERTAIN HOW TO MANAGE
WASTE DISPOSAL CRISIS IN WAKE OF THIRD CIRCUIT
DECISION IN HARVEY & HARVEY, INC. v.COUNTY
OF CHESTER

I.

INTRODUCTION

It's garbage day and Uncle Sam forgot to take out the trash,
again. Although everyone forgets to take out the garbage once in a
while, the government has forgotten for decades. Not surprisingly,
our country home is becoming increasingly unhealthy and is look2
ing a bit cluttered.
1. Jimmy Buffett, Lage Nom Ai, on BAROMETER SOUP, (MCA Records, Inc.
1995). This lyric is a poignant expression of both the confusion and frustration
which state and local governments experience after efforts to control the waste
disposal crisis have been invalidated on constitutional grounds, especially after
great environmental and economic expense. It is also representative of the
ambiguities in the law governing municipal waste ordinances, and reflective of the
opinion of many political actors that decisions of the Supreme Court and circuit
courts are incomprehensible, leaving state and local governments with no
constitutionally valid alternatives. As a result, many leaders are confused about
whether anything can be done to alleviate the waste disposal crisis without
offending the Constitution.
2. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.102(a) (1) (West Supp. 1997). In section
4000.102 (a) (1) of the Pennsylvania Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling & Waste
Reduction Act of 1988, the legislature found that "improper municipal waste practices create public health hazards, environmental pollution and economic loss,
and cause irreparable harm to the public health, safety and welfare." Id. Similarly, the Pennsylvania Legislature determined that the waste management measures contained and recommended in the Act, including flow control measures,
"[p] rotect the public health, safety and welfare from the short- and long-term dangers of [the] ... disposal of municipal waste." Id. § 4000.102(b) (3).
The legislature also found that uncontrolled increases of waste production
and ineffective waste management has "threatened to significantly and adversely
affect public health and safety . . ." and that "[u]ncontrolled increases in daily
waste volumes can also cause increased noise, odors, truck traffic and other significant adverse effects on the environment as well as on public health and safety." Id.
§ 4000.102(a) (21).
Chief Justice Rehnquist captured the extent and impact of the waste problem
by writing that "[t]he substantial environmental, aesthetic, health, and safety
problems flowing from this country's waste piles were already apparent at the time
we decided Philadelphia. Those problems have only risen in the intervening years."
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504
U.S. 353, 368 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution
Liability Insurance Coverage, The Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance
Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia, 21 ENVrL. L. 357, 369-70 (1991)).

(225)
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The amount of solid waste produced in the United States each
year is rapidly increasing while disposal space is shrinking. 3 The
amount of solid waste produced in 1990 is more than double what
it was just a few decades ago. 4 As a result of increased solid waste
generation, eighty percent of landfills that operated in 1989 will
exhaust their capacities and close within the next fifteen years.5 De3. See Michael R. Harpering, Comment, Out Like Yesterday's Garbage:Municipal
Waste and the Need for CongressionalAction, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 851, 852 n.3 (1991)
(quoting EPA, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE TASK FORCE, The Solid Waste Dilemma: An

Agenda for Action, Pub. No. EPA-530-sw-89-019 8 (1989)). In 1988, the National
Wildlife Federation reported that landfills were closing at the rate of approximately one per day. See generally Bill Lawren, Getting Into a Heap of Trouble, NATIONAL WILDLIFE Aug.-Sept. 1988, at 19.

The Supreme Court has also recognized the landfill shortage crisis. See Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Recources, 504
U.S. 353, 369 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that "[i]t is no secret why capacity is not expanding sufficiently to meet demandthe substantial risks attendant to waste sites makes them extraordinarily untenable
neighbors." Id. (citing Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245,
253 (3d Cir. 1989)).
4. See David R. Teece, Note, GarbageIn, Garbage Out: The Seventh Circuit Misuses
the Commerce Clause to Trash Wisconsin's Recycling Law, 15 J.L. & COM. 677 (1996)
(citing Kristen Engel, Reconsideringthe National Market in Solid Waste, 73 N.C. L. REV.
1481, 1488 n.23 (1995)) (quoting EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, Characterizationof

Municipal Solid Waste in the United States: 1992 Update, Pub. No. EPA-530-r-92-019
ES-3 (1992)).
In 1960, the United States produced 88.2 million tons of municipal waste as
compared to 129 million tons in 1990. See Aaron H. Simpson, The New Hampshire!
Vermont Solid Waste Project: Is There a Solution?, 20 VT. L. REv. 1091, 1093 n.21
(1996). Later in 1993, over 207 million tons of garbage was produced, 65-80% of
which was disposed of in county and city landfills. See Flow Control and Interstate
Transp. of Solid Waste: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk
Assessment of the Senate Comm. on Env't. and Public Works, 104th Cong. 107 (1995)
[hereinafter Interstate Transportation] (statement of Randy Johnson, County Commissioner, Hennepin County, Minnesota).
In fact, "American's produce more garbage, both per person and in absolute
amounts, than any other nation in the world." Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid Waste
Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce Clause, 39 S.D. L. REV. 529 (1994) [hereinafter
Wolf, Solid Waste Crisis]. The amount of garbage currently produced "is enough
waste to fill a convoy of ten-ton garbage trucks 140,000 miles long; 'over five times
the distance around the Earth's equator and over halfway from here to the
moon."' Id. (quoting PAUL RELIS & ANTHONY DOMINISKI, BEYOND THE CRISIS: INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT 4 (3d prtg. 1990)).
These rates of municipal solid waste production are expected to increase. See

Simpson, supra at 1093. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) predicts
waste production will continue to increase at the rate of 1.6% until the year 2000.
See id. at 1094. In the years 2000 to 2010, the rate is expected to increase by 1.5%.
See id. Currently, each individual in the United States now generates about 1500
pounds of solid waste per year, as compared to an expected annual production

rate of 1775 pounds per individual by the year 2010. See id. The rate of waste
generation in the United States will increase by over 200 million tons per year by
the beginning of the next decade. See id.
5. See Alice Jean Mansell, North DakotaEnters the Dumping Ground Wars: A Case
Study for Incentive-Based Regulations, 69 N.D. L. REv. 575, 581-82 (1993).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss1/6

2

1998]

& HARVEY
Koons: Without a ClueHARVEY
and Still without
a Master Plan: Municipalities Le

spite these national problems, Congress has failed to provide state
or municipal governments with the necessary tools to effectively
deal with this mounting crisis. 6 As a result, state and local governments have been strapped with the financial burdens and planning
6. See Teece, supra note 4, at 695-96. Congress recently debated the merits of
delegating powers to states and municipalities to implement various measures, including flow control. See Laura Gabrysch, Constitutional Law - Dormant Commerce
Clause - Flow Control Ordinances that Require Disposal of Trash at a Designated Facility
Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 563, 597-98 nn.123-124
(1995). Unfortunately, no flow control proposals have yet been enacted. See id. at
574.
Although Congress has not passed any legislation enabling the states to effectively deal with the increasing waste crisis, it has nevertheless, debated the issue on
several occasions. See S. REP. No. 104-52, at 4 (1995). The history of this debate is
discussed in the Interstate Transportation of Municipal Solid Waste Act of 1995 in
the Committee on Environment and Public Works' general statement as follows:
Since 1990, the Environment and Public Works Committee has held 3
hearings (June 18, 1990; July 18, 1991; and March 1, 1995) to review the
issues posed by the interstate shipment of municipal solid waste. Over
the past five years, the Committee has worked to develop a solution that
would preserve the advantages of interstate commerce, while providing
States some new authority to create a more orderly and predictable flow
of waste imports and exports.
In the 102d Congress, the Committee reported S.976, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments of 1992, a bill that addressed a wide range of solid waste issues. Section 412 of the bill provided authority for Governors to restrict the disposal of out-of-State waste,
but the legislation was not considered by the full Senate. The Senate
subsequently approved separate legislation addressing interstate shipment of waste, S.2877, the Interstate Transportation of Municipal Solid
Waste Act of 1992, by a vote of 89-2, on July 23, 1992. No comparable
legislation was approved by the House.
During the 103d Congress, the Committee unanimously reported S.
2345, the Interstate Transportation of Municipal Solid Waste Act of 1994
(Senate Report 103-322), to provide legal authority to every State to restrict out-of-State MSW. S.2345 was approved in the Senate by voice vote
on September 30, 1994. The legislation would have allowed every Governor to freeze MSW exports at 1993 levels, and to ban future MSW imports
to facilities not receiving such waste in 1993 if the affected local community did not want to receive out-of-state MSW. In addition, the bill included an "export state ratchet" to reduce the level of MSW exports from
large exporting States and an "import State ratchet" to ensure that no
single State received large amounts of MSW from another State.
On September 29, 1994, the House of Representatives approved its
own interstate package, H.R. 4683, and after adding flow control language, a modified version of S.2345 was approved by the House on October 7, 1994. The Senate received the bill, including both interstate waste
and flow control provisions, on October 8, 1994, the last day of the Senate session. S.2345, as approved by the House, was not considered on the
Senate floor.
Thus far in the 104th Congress, several bills have been referred to
the Environment Committee that would authorize State restrictions on
imports of waste in certain circumstances, including S.456 introduced by
Senator Baucus, S.589, introduced by Senator Coats and S.542, introduced by Senator Conrad. Generally, these bills build on the provisions
of S.2877 and S.2345.
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responsibilities of developing more effective waste management

programs.

7

On March 1, 1995, Senate Environment and Public Works Committee's Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment Subcommittee held
a hearing on the issue of interstate waste and flow control.
In response to the testimony received at the hearing, Senator Robert
Smith, Chairman of the Subcommittee and Senator John H. Chafee,
Chairman of the full committee, introduced S. 534, a bill to amend the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, to provide authority for States to regulate the
interstate transportation of municipal solid waste and to provide States
and political subdivisions authority to flow control waste. The bill, as
amended, was ordered reported unanimously, by voice vote, from the
Superfund Subcommittee on March 15, 1995. The Full Committee ordered the bill reported, as amended, on March 23, 1995, by a rollcall vote
of 16 to 0.
Several bills authorizing flow control were referred to the Committee in
the 103rd Congress, including S. 2227, introduced by Senator
Lautenberg and S. 1634, introduced by Senator Heflin. In addition, during the 103rd Congress, the Committee held a hearing on the issue of
flow control (July 13, 1994).
Thus far in the 104th Congress, several bills have been referred to the
Committee authorizing States and political subdivisions to impose flow
control, including S. 398, introduced by Senator Lautenberg and S. 485,
introduced by Senator Hutchinson.
Id. at 4-9.
7. See Interstate Transportation,supra note 4, at 107-10. RandyJohnson, on behalf of the National Association of Counties and the National League of Cities
stated that "[l]ocal governments provided over 17.8 billion [dollars] of the estimated costs of managing solid waste in this country - over 95% of the total costs.
Not one penny from the federal budget is received by local governments to plan or
implement solid waste management programs." Id.; see also Lawren, supra note 3.
The economic impacts of the shortage of landfill space and effective waste disposal
planning is evident in the fact that San Francisco alone spent $2.5 million just to
reserve space for its municipal waste. See id. Similarly, facility shortages forced the
City of Philadelphia to send its waste over 100 miles away for disposal. See id.
These problems have also been highlighted by politicians during many election years. See id. For example, in 1987, five of the seven candidates running for
the NewJersey Legislature stated that the management of municipal waste was the
number one issue in their campaigns. See id. at 19-20. The former mayor of Lincoln, Nebraska supplemented this sentiment by saying that "garbage is the kind of
issue that can unseat an incumbent mayor." Id. at 20.
Mr. James V. Sears, Director of Solid Waste Management, Marion County, Oregon, summarized the economic impact of Congress's failure to authorize states
and localities to deal with the garbage crisis. See Flow Control Measures and Interstate
Transportation of Solid Waste: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Hazardous Materialsof the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 44 (1995) [hereinafter Flow Control Measures] (statement of Mr. James V. Sears, Director, Department
of Solid Waste Management, Marion County, Oregon). He stated:
[T]here have already been serious financial . . . consequences to many
communities throughout the United States ... because of the failure of
the previous Congress to enact the authorizing legislation necessitated by
the Carbone case. As examples of this I should note the following:
On March 17, Moody's Investors Service lowered its rating for $237.2
million in bonds issued by Fairfax County, Virginia to construct Fairfax's
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The national waste disposal crisis began in the 1970's and
80's.8 During these years, tax reforms and stricter environmental

regulations placed substantial constraints on the effective operation
of private waste disposal facilities. 9 Consequently, landfill closures
environmentally advanced waste-to-energy facility. The absence of flow
control legislation was the pivotal factor sited by Moody's in taking this
action.
Just four weeks earlier, on February 17, Moody's lowered the bond ratings
of five New Jersey waste management authorities as a direct consequence of
the absence of federal flow control legislation.
... Bond rating agencies are currently reviewing many additional solid waste
bond issues for possible downgrades. Downgrading will result in increased costs to
the taxpayers in these jurisdictions, including increases in the cost of many other
public service needs that require bond financing.
In an increasing number of communities in various states including not only
Virginia and NewJersey, but also Florida, Maine, Pennsylvania, Ohio, North Carolina, New York and elsewhere, we are receiving reports of substantial loss of revenue, potential insolvency and decreases in recycling caused by the diversion of
waste to environmentally less beneficial management methods. These developments are a direct result of the absence of federal flow control legislation.
Id.
8. See, e.g., Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 791 (3d
Cir. 1995) (stating during the 1970's and 80's, national environmental concerns
sparked greater regulations which caused landfill closures, capacity shortfalls, and
increased disposal costs); Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 48 F.3d 701, 704 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating "[b]y
the late 1980's, the 'solid waste crisis' had become a national issue," and that
"[t] his crisis has been well documented in both the caselaw of this court and the
New Jersey courts.") (citing J. Filiberto Sanitation v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913, 918-19 (3d Cir. 1988)); Trade Waste Management Ass'n v.
Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 223 (3d Cir. 1985); A.A. Mastrangelo, Inc. v. Comm'r of
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 449 A.2d 516, 518-19 (N.J. 1982); Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 348 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1975),
rev'd sub noma. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Southern
Ocean Landfill, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of the Township of Ocean, 314 A.2d 65,
66-67 (N.J. 1974); In re Scioscia, 524 A.2d 855, 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987).
9. See Simpson, supra note 4, at 1094-95; see also Richard J. Roddewig & Glen
C. Sechen, Report of the Comm. on Land Use, Planningand ZoningLaw, MunicipalSolid
Waste: The UncertainFuture of Flow Control a Municipal Perspective, 26 URB. LAw. 801,
802 (1994) (stating "[a]s regulation of the landfill industry increased, costs increased as well"). Among the regulations which made operation of waste facilities
more costly was the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) enacted in
1976. See Simpson, supra note 4, at 1094. The Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works listed some of the more expensive elements required by RCRA
when it reported that new RCRA "standards require landfill liners, leachate collection and treatment, groundwater and gas monitoring, corrective action, and closure and post closure care." S. REP. No. 104-52, at 2 (1995). Cathy Berg Moeger, of
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency stated that "[1]arge numbers of substandard landfills and other substandard waste management facilities in Minnesota
have closed and will continue to close here and around the country as the RCRA
Subtitle D standards become applicable and as the Clean Air Act amendments of
1990 force smaller, previously unregulated waste incinerators to close." Municipal
Solid Waste Flow Control: Hearing on H.R. 1357 and H.R. 2649 Before the Subcomm. on
Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
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became a common experience, and this, in turn, led to facility
shortages and more expensive disposal costs. 10 Pennsylvania was no
exception to this trend."
103d Cong. 93 (1993) [hereinafter Waste Flow Control Hearing](statement of Cathy
Berg Moeger, Executive Assistant, Groundwater and Solid Waste, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency); see also Harvey, 68 F.3d at 791 (stating "regulation led to a
large number of landfill closures throughout the United States, creating shortages
in many places and driving up landfill pricing"); Atlantic Coast,48 F.3d at 704 (stating New Jersey's "persistent actions to implement rigorous environmental standards on landfill[s] ... resulted in a serious shortfall in disposal capacity").
Amendments to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 also exacerbated the waste disposal crisis by causing increased closures of private waste facilities. See generally Eric S.
Petersen & David N. Abramowitz, Municipal Solid Waste Flow Control in the Post Carbone World, 22 FoRr-iAm Uius. L.J. 361 (1995). Until this point, the majority of
waste facilities were privately owned and operated. See id. These tax amendments,
however, made private ownership and financing increasingly impossible. See id. at
367 n.36. For example:
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 25 U.S.C. § 144(e) (1) (A) .... resulted in a
reduced amount of qualified private activity bond funding which may be
issued as tax-exempt securities. 26 U.S.C. § 141 (e) (1)(A), 142(a) (6). Additionally, the changes essentially abolished the investment tax credit
available to companies on equipment in such facilities and reduced the
depreciation benefits on the property and equipment of which private
owners could take advantage. The two tax elements had provided a substantial cash flow for private owners under the prior tax laws.
Id.
10. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 791-92 (citing Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9,
at 361 n.33); see also Roddewig & Sechen, supra note 9, at 802 (stating landfill
closures resulted from increased costs of regulations); James C. Vago, Comment,
The UncertainFuture of Flow Control Ordinances: The Last Trash to Clarkstown?, 22 N.
Ky. L. REv. 93, 98 (1995).
The facility closing crisis, as it affected New Jersey, was highlighted by the
Third Circuit when it stated that:
By the early 1980's, the department had closed, or was in the process of
closing, over 300 unsafe or unregulated landfills that posed serious environmental hazards or had exhausted capacity. However, the department's persistent actions to implement rigorous environmental standards
on landfill construction and operations, coupled with a steady influx of
millions of tons of waste annually from neighboring states during the
1970's, resulted in serious shortfall of disposal capacity in the state.
Atlantic Coast, 48 F.3d at 704.
11. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.102(a)(21) (West Supp. 1997). This section provides that:
[U]ncontrolled increases in the daily volumes of solid waste received at
municipal waste landfills have significantly decreased their remaining lifetimes, disrupting the municipal waste planning process and the ability of
municipalities relying on the landfills to continue using them. These increases have threatened to significantly and adversely affect public health
and safety when municipalities find they can no longer use the facilities.
Id.; see also Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 366. In fact, Florida and most
of the northeastern United States experienced stricter environmental and tax regulations which ultimately led to the closure of private waste facilities. See id. For
example, in NewJersey, over 300 landfills were closed by the early 1980's because
of unsafe conditions and exhausted capacity. See Atlantic Coast, 48 F.3d at 704. The
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy continued to require more
rigorous environmental standards on landfill operation and construction. See id.
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As a result of waste facility closures and the lack of incentives
for private ownership, public ownership became necessary. 12 Municipalities entering the waste disposal and management market
found the construction and operation of waste facilities to be extremely expensive. 13 In an effort to cover huge capital expenditures necessary for the construction and maintenance of such
facilities, states authorized municipalities to adopt waste management plans and flow control measures. The legislature designed
this newly created statutory authority to ensure financing of the facilities. 14 Still, these measures have received a great deal of scrutiny
This caused additional closures and a "serious shortfall of disposal capacity in the

state." Id.
12. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 792. The Harvey court stated that public ownership
was a response to the tax changes and increased costs of operating landfills stemming from increased regulation. See id. (citing Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note
9, at 367). As a result of these tax changes and increased costs, private ownership
became less profitable, and as a result, less attractive. See Petersen & Abramowitz,
supra note 9, at 367. Public facilities attempted to fill the void created by largescale facility closure. See id.
13. See Sidney M. Wolf, CongressionalBailout of Flow Control: Saving the Burning
Beast, 7 ViL. ENVrL. L.J. 263, 267 (1996) [hereinafter Wolf, Congressional
Bailout] (citing Wolf, Solid Waste Crisis, supra note 4, at 538 (1994)) (stating construction of "a state-of-the-art landfill can easily cost $150 million"); see also Harvey,
68 F.3d at 792 (stating "State and federal environmental mandates often require
the use of. . . more expensive facilities"). These "environmentally advanced, innovative waste disposal facilities can cost 'in the tens to hundreds of millions of dollars to construct.'" Id. (citing Vago, supra note 10, at 98); see also Petersen &
Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 369 (1995) (asserting waste facilities typically cost
"tens of millions of dollars").
14. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supranote 9, at 370. Flow control is illustrated
by the Harvey court as "a system in which waste haulers are licensed by the municipality and are directed to take the waste collected to the landfills that have been
designated by the county." Harvey, 68 F.3d at 792; see alsoJohn Turner, The Flow
Control of Solid Waste and The Commerce Clause: Carbone and Its Progeny, 7 VILL. ENVTL.
LJ. 203, 207 n.24 (1996) (citing NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH AssocIATEs, THE
COST OF FLOW CONTROL at 2, 5 (May 3, 1995) (discussing flow control and its
purposes)).

Flow control has been defined as:
[T] he ability of local governments to require that municipal solid waste
generated within ajurisdiction be processed at a designated disposal site,
transfer station, recycling facility or other waste processing facility. Flow
control authority has been important to local government solid waste programs in part because it makes financing for capital facilities possible at
affordable rates. Flow control authority has ensured investors and others
that a particular facility will generate a sufficient level of waste disposal
... to pay debt service bonds. With flow control authority, local governments have usually been able to obtain "investment grade" ratings from
bond rating agencies, ensuring a reasonable cost of capital financing.
Flow control has also been utilized in numerous jurisdictions to help ensure the sufficiency of revenue for facilities owned and operated by private companies.
Flow Control Measures, supra note 7, at 83 (statement of Micah S. Green, Executive
Vice President, Public Securities Association).
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15
over the past few years, and many courts have invalidated them.
In effect, municipalities have faced increasing uncertainty about
16
how to manage their waste disposal problems.
In light of the solid waste disposal crisis, the importance of
waste disposal and flow control jurisprudence is apparent. For instance, municipalities have created sizeable debt by issuing millions

In 1993, "over 30 states ha[d] some kind of flow control authority." Municipal
Solid Waste Flow Control, 1993: Hearingon H.P, 1357 and 2649 Before the Subcomm. on
Transportation and Hazardous Materials, 103d Cong. 93, at 17 (1993) (statement of
David Minge, Minnesota). Other sources report that at least twenty-seven states
had passed legislation which authorized flow controlling waste. See Roddewig &
Sechen, supra note 9 at 804; see also Wolf, Solid Waste Crisis, supra note 4, at 535-36
(1994) (citing Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 510 U.S. 961 (1993)(No. 92-1403)).
The following states have adopted legislation permitting localities to regulate
waste through flow control measures: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia
and Wisconsin. See Roddewig & Sechen, supra note 9, at 805 n.21.
15. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383
(1994) (invalidating flow control ordinance which required all trash produced
within municipality pass through transfer station before being allowed out of
town); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 367-68 (invalidating waste import restriction which
said waste generated in another county, state or country could not be accepted
absent explicit authorization by county plan); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating state statute which prohibited most forms of
waste from being imported from anywhere outside of state).
This judicial scrutiny was reflected by Mr. William Kovacs, an attorney at the
Washington firm of Leller & Heckman, when he pointed out that flow control
ordinances have been litigated for two decades. See generally Courts Might Settle Flow
Control Issues Before Congress Can Pass Oxley Bil, [Nov. 2, 1995] 26 Solid Waste Rep.
(Bus. Publishers, Inc.) No. 43, available in 1995 WL 8152510. Kovacs also stated
that the controversy will persist because flow control ordinances will continue to be
litigated in the future. See id. As a result, the validity of flow control has been
deemed of monumental significance and an issue which affects the waste management industry more than any other issue. See id.
16. See Teece, supra note 4, at 696. For example, RCRA encourages the type
of solid waste planning that has been implemented by many states and municipalities. See Gabrysch, supra, note 6, at 589 (arguing Carboneordinance was consistent
with congressional objectives and should not have been declared unconstitutional). Recently, municipalities have become confused about how they should
deal with waste disposal problems because, although their plans comply with
RCRA's objectives for solid waste management, the Supreme Court and other
courts have held these ordinances invalid in cases like Carbone. See id. As a result,
legal writers have attempted to negotiate the current confusion to recommend
measures which would provide effective waste management without violating the
Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 395-407.
Although there has been much speculation over what alternatives municipalities
could pursue, four options have been suggested which some argue are "viable alternative methods that should withstand Commerce Clause challenges .... " Id. at
395.
For a discussion of the alternatives that have been suggested as available to
municipalities, see infra notes 189-238 and accompanying text.
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of dollars in bonds to finance the construction of waste facilities.
The invalidation of flow control ordinances eliminates the vehicle
by which municipalities had intended to satisfy their debts.1 7 As a
result, the negative financial effects are felt by both the municipality and its residents through increased taxes. 18 Additionally, invalidating the plans postpones environmentally sound waste disposal
and exacerbates the waste disposal crisis.' 9 Consequently, negative
17. For a discussion of the debt incurred by Chester County, Pennsylvania, see
infra note 89. For a discussion of the expenses associated with the construction
and maintenance of waste facilities, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
18. See Flow Control Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 2227 Before the Subcomm. on
Superfund, Recycling, and Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 103d Cong. 85-87 (1994) [hereinafter Flow Control Act] (statement
of Hon. Christopher Smith, U.S. Representative from the State of New Jersey).
Congressman Smith stated that the invalidation of flow control measures through
cases like Carboneforce "[c]ounty taxpayers [to] face the prospect of additional
taxes or reduced services to fulfill contract requirements for bonds already sold."
Id. at 86. He continued to state that invalidation could have the effect of increased
"disposal fees which would inevitably mean higher local property taxes." Id.
19. For example, the loss of flow control makes recycling efforts less likely to
be successful. See Flow Control Act, supra note 18, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg); see also Recycling Law Turns 10, Amid Uncertainty,BERGEN REcoRD, Apr.
30, 1997, at A-3 (stating "[a] nother potential threat to NewJersey recycling efforts
is a federal court decision that says that states cannot force garbage haulers to
dump their loads at county-run facilities . . ." and that "[w]e've only been able to

achieve [the recycling rate] because it is subsidized by trash tipping fees and that
will not be able to continue after deregulation.") This, in turn, has two additional
effects: (1) waste that could otherwise be recycled and removed from the waste
stream unnecessarily occupies landfill space, thus increasing the demand for already decreasing landfill space, and (2) failure of recycling efforts increases environmental and health risks. See Flow Control Measures, supra note 7, at 44.
(statement of James V. Sears, Director, Department of Solid Waste Management,
Marion County, Oregon). Mr. Sears stated that:
The absence of flow control authority was a significant factor in the late
1994 closing of two Ohio waste management facilities - in Akron and Columbus. A directly related consequence of the shutdown of the Columbus.facility is that 50,000 tons (annual amount) of various metals that had
previously been recycled (by just that one facility) are now being put in a
landfill - Columbus has been forced to terminate recycling of that huge
volume of metals.
Id.
Similarly, in a statement to the House, a Joint Statement of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the Municipal Waste Management Association revealed that
"[a]s a result of a federal district court decision that [a] [c]ounty's waste flow ordinance [was] unconstitutional, the [c]ounty has been unable to finance construction of a new 600-ton per day waste to energy facility and commercial materials
recycling facility, necessary to meet the State-mandated reduction and recycling
goals." Waste Flow Control Hearing,supranote 9, at 225. In fact, it has been argued
that flow control not only encourages recycling, but that it also has played an important part in the development of technological advances in recycling. See The
Impact of Solid Waste Flow Control on Small Businesses and Commerce: HearingBefore the
Comm. on Small Business, 104th Cong. 237 (1995) [hereinafter Impact of Solid Waste]
(letter from the Local Government Coalition for Environmentally Sound Municipal Solid Waste Management).
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health impacts are a very real threat.20 Therefore, as a practical
effect, the judicial decisions in flow control cases are considerably
important because of their impact on virtually every facet of our
lives.
This Note analyzes the legal debate surrounding flow control
ordinances and demonstrates that flow controlling waste is both a
practical and constitutionally sound method of tackling the national waste crisis. Specifically, Part II examines important flow
control jurisprudence by providing a framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of any waste management or flow control ordinance. Part III presents the factual background and procedural history of Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester.2 1 Part IV analyzes
the reasoning employed by the Third Circuit in deciding Harvey.
Part V critically analyzes the Third Circuit's holding, and suggests
that the Chester and Mercer County flow control ordinances could
have survived strict scrutiny and should have been declared constitutional. Finally, Part VI discusses the potential financial, environmental and social impacts of the Harvey decision.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution has
been characterized as "one of the primary objects for which the
people of America adopted their government." 22 Article I states
that "Congress shall have power to . . .regulate Commerce . . .

among the several States." 23 This grant of authority allows Congress
to regulate "the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts
of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules
24
for carrying on that intercourse."
Although the Commerce Clause is cast as an affirmative grant
of power to Congress, the Clause also implies that it limits the powers of the states, and thereby has given rise to the term "Dormant
20. The negative health and environmental consequences resulting from
delayed or postponed recycling efforts are not the only negative effects of flow
control invalidation. For a discussion of the negative impacts on recycling efforts
stemming from flow control invalidation, see supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
21. 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
22. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); see also Cook v. County of Marshall, 196 U.S. 261, 272 (1905) (stating that "[i]ndeed, it may be said that without
[the Commerce Clause] the Constitution would not have been adopted.").
23. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90.
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Commerce Clause. ' 25 In essence, because the power to regulate
interstate commerce has traditionally been interpreted as a grant of
power to Congress, the Dormant Commerce Clause limits the

25. See id. at 236. Although there is no language or provision of the Constitution which explicitly prohibits states from regulating or burdening interstate commerce, such a prohibition has been read into the Commerce Clause. See Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc. 447 U.S.
27, 35 (1980)). In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court
recognized this by stating that "'although the Clause thus speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the Court has long recognized that it also limits the
power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade.'" Id. (quoting Lewis,

447 U.S. at 35).
Writing for the Court in Gibbons, Justice Marshall noted "when a state proceeds to regulate commerce ... among the several states, it is exercising the very
power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is
authorized to do." Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199-200. He continued:
It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant that, as the word
to "regulate" implies in its nature full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform
the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for
the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they were, as
well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is
as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power
designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated. There is
great force in this argument, and the court is not satisfied that it has been
refuted.
Id. at 209.
Although the power to regulate commerce has been recognized as the province of the federal government, the clause has not been read as a complete bar to
all state regulations affecting interstate commerce. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851). Justice Curtis established this point in Cooley, when he
wrote:
The diversities of opinion, therefore, which have existed on [the subject
of state power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause] have arisen
from the different views taken of the nature of this power. But when the
nature of a power like this is spoken of, when it is said that the nature of
the power requires that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, it
must be intended to refer to the subjects of that power, and to say they
are of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Now,
the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not
only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature;
some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on
the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which
alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of [the Commerce] power requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of
the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all of
them, what is really applicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of this
power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system,
or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.
Id. at 319.
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state's authority to regulate interstate commerce. 26 As Chief Justice
Marshall wrote in Gibbons v. Ogden, Congress has the exclusive

power to regulate commerce, and therefore, if Congress does not
27
exercise this power, it must "lie dormant."
The purpose of the Commerce Clause was to give Congress the
power to prevent the perceived evils of protectionist trade by the
states. 2 8 Courts evaluate legislative acts to determine whether there
26. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189; see also South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1984) (stating "[a]lthough the Commerce Clause is by its text
an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the Clause has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the
power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce"); Lewis, 447 U.S. at 35; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979);
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-38 (1949).
27. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189 (1824). In utilizing this exclusive commerce
power, Congress has three options available to it. It can exercise it directly, as it
did in Gibbons, by granting a ferry monopoly. See id. This form of commerce
power is the most obvious positive grant of authority which is explicitly stated in
the Constitution. See, e.g.,
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S.
383, 401 (1994) (stating the Commerce Clause "empowers Congress to regulate
interstate commerce"); South-Centra4 467 U.S. at 87 (stating "the Commerce Clause
is by its text an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce").
Alternatively, Congress can refrain from exercising any regulatory power at
all, thereby requiring that specific areas of commerce lie dormant and unregulated
by the states. See, e.g., Carbone, 511 U.S. at 402 (stating Court's prior decisions hold
"[D]ormant Commerce Clause forbids States and their subdivisions from regulating interstate commerce").
Finally, Congress can expressly authorize the states to regulate an area of commerce that would, absent express authorization, be outside state regulatory powers.
See id. at 401 (stating in "absence of Congressional action," states are barred from
regulating interstate commerce); South-Centra4 467 U.S. at 87-88 (stating that
"Congress may 'redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce' by
'permit[ting] the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible'") (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
769 (1945)).
28. See Brown v. Maryland, 12 U.S. 419, 445 (1827). Chief Justice Marshall
observed that the Commerce Clause was adopted as a result of the experiences of
the Confederacy when he wrote:
The oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous to the adoption
of the constitution can scarcely be forgotten. It was regulated by foreign
nations with a single view to their own interests; and our disunited efforts
to counteract their restrictions were rendered impotent by want of combination. Congress, indeed, possessed the power of making treaties; but
the inability of the Federal government to enforce them had become so
apparent as to render that power in a great degree useless. Those who
felt the injury arising from this state of things, and those who were capable of estimating the influence of commerce on the prosperity of the nations, perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important
subject to a single government. It may be doubted whether any of the
evils proceeding from the feebleness of the federal government, contributed more to that great revolution which introduced the present system,
than the deep and general conviction, that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress.
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has been a Commerce Clause violation while keeping this purpose
in mind.29 As a result, the judiciary has developed a two part test to
determine whether an act violates the Commerce Clause. 30
Part one of the test asks whether the challenged act discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in its effect. 3 1

If the challenging party can establish discrimination, part two of the
test is triggered. This requires the state or political subdivision to
prove that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose and that the
purpose could not have been served "as well"3 2 by nondiscrimina-

tory alternatives. 33 If the court finds that the legitimate interest can
Id. at 445-46.

Justice Frankfurter reiterated Marshall's impressions when he wrote that the
Commerce Clause "was an authorization to remove those commercial obstructions
and harassments to which the militant new free states subjected one another, and
to enable the community of the states to present a united commercial front to the
world." FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND

WAITE 13 (1937); see generally Carbone, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). In Carbone, the
Supreme Court annunciated the purpose of the Commerce Clause stating that,
"[t]he central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or
municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent." Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390.
29. See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 5-7
(1986). Even scholars who believe that there is little evidence to interpret the
Commerce Clause agree that "[t]
here does not appear to have been . . . 'any considerable (if, indeed, there was any) opposition to the grant of the [Commerce]
power.' It was reported in the first draft of the Constitution exactly as it now stands
..."FREDERICK H. COLE,THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 5-

6 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. ed., 1908).
30. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 402; see also Maine, 477 U.S. at 138; Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 141-42 (1970).
31. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 402; Maine, 477 U.S. at 138; Hughes, 441 U.S. at
322, 336; Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(1951).
Discrimination has been defined as the "differential treatment of in-state and
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."
Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788, 797 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Oregon Waste Sys. Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994)).
32. See Maine, 477 U.S. at 138 (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336); see also Harvey,
68 F.3d at 797. The Third Circuit reiterated the standard established by the
Supreme Court when it wrote that "[i]f 'a state law is shown to discriminate against
interstate commerce 'either on its face or in practical effect,' the burden falls on
the State to demonstrate that the statute 'serves a legitimate local purpose,' and
that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory
means." Id. at 797 (emphasis added) (quoting Maine, 477 U.S. at 138).
33. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 797 (stating that state party which proves there is
legitimate local purpose has additional burden of establishing that "this purpose
could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means") (emphasis added) (quoting Maine, 477 U.S. at 131) (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336); see also Hunt,
432 U.S. at 353; Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354.
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be achieved by a less discriminatory alternative, the act will be declared unconstitutional as discriminating against interstate commerce.3 4 Although part one of this test is applied to acts which
discriminate both in effect or on their face, courts have employed it
35
more often where an ordinance is facially discriminatory.
However, if the challenging party does not establish that the
is
act discriminatory, the court will apply a balancing test. 36 Under
34. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-92. The Carbone Court stated this principle
when it wrote that "[d ] iscrimination against interstate commerce ...is per se invalid, [unless] the municipality can demonstrate . .. that it has no other means to
advance a legitimate local interest." Id. (emphasis added); see also Maine, 477 U.S.
at 131 (holding as constitutional "Maine's ban on the importation of live baitfish
because it serves legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by
available nondiscriminatory alternatives").
35. See generally Carbone,511 U.S. 383 (applying discrimination test and holding as unconstitutional requirement that local waste be shipped to designated
transfer station); Fort Gratiot, 594 U.S. 353 (applying discrimination test and holding that waste import restrictions unambiguously discriminate against interstate
commerce and could not be distinguished from Philadelphia);Philadelphia,437 U.S.
617 (holding ban on most forms of out of state waste discriminates both on its face
and in effect); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. 349 (applying discrimination test and holding act is still discriminatory where in-state and out-of-state parties are both covered by prohibition).
36. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The Court annunciated that the general rule of
the balancing test, although "variously stated," is: "Where the statute regulates even
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
(citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). The Court continued, stating that "[i]f a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." Id. at 142.
In Pike, the Court was asked to decide the constitutionality of a state statute
which required Arizona grown produce to be packaged in-state. See id. at 138-40.
The law was enacted in "fear that some growers were shipping inferior or deceptively packaged produce, with the result that the reputation of Arizona growers
generally was being tarnished and their financial return concomitantly reduced."
Id. at 143. The plaintiff was an Arizona cantaloupe grower who did not own packaging facilities in-state, but who shipped the goods to its nearby facility in California for packaging. See id. at 139. This packaging bore the California name. See id.
Pursuant to the statute, Arizona sought to prohibit the plaintiff from exporting the
products and to force the producer to comply with the law by packaging the goods
in-state. See id. at 139. The plaintiff alleged the law was burdensome because compliance would force the company to construct a new packaging facility within Arizona at an estimated cost of $200,000. See id. at 140.
The Court found the statute imposed an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce. See id. at 146. Although the Court recognized that Arizona had a
legitimate local interest in preserving the name of its produce by preventing deceptive packaging of inferior goods, it nevertheless determined that this purpose
was not what motivated the state to enforce the law against the plaintiff. See id. at
144. The Court found that Arizona was not acting to protect its name from being
tarnished, but rather, because "[iut [was] within Arizona's legitimate interest to
require that interstate cantaloupe purchasers be informed that this high quality...
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this test, commonly referred to as the Pike balancing test, an act will
be deemed constitutional unless the burdens imposed by the act
upon interstate commerce are "clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits."3 7 This balancing test is applied by courts
when an ordinance, although nondiscriminatory in nature, imposes
38
unnecessary burdens on the flow of interstate commerce.
B.

Commerce Clause Jurisprudence

Since the landmark Supreme Court decision of C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,39 the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been divided into three categories: pre-Carbonejurisprudence, the Carbone case itself, and post-Carbonejurisprudence.
Important decisions from these categories shape contemporary
flow control cases.
1. Pre-Carbone Jurisprudence
Pre-Carbonejurisprudence finds its roots in City ofPhiladelphiav.
New Jersey,40 where the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality
of a New Jersey law which prohibited the importation of most forms
of out-of-state waste. 4 1 The state of New Jersey argued that its landfruit was grown in Arizona." Id. at 144. Therefore, the Court determined that
Arizona was not worried about a tarnished name, but rather, wanted credit for its
own products. See id. The Court pointed out that this is a less than a compelling
interest standard. See id. at 146. The Court held these reputation interests to be
insufficient when balanced against the burdens placed on the individual grower.
See id.
As an example of where the balancing test has been used, the Harvey court
cited Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. See Harvey, 63 F.3d at 797 (citing 449 U.S.
456 (1981)). In Clover Leaf Creamery, the Supreme Court determined that the statute in question did not discriminate on its face or in practical effect. See id. at 797.
Rather, the Court applied the balancing test "[b]ecause the statute imposed burdens on both in-state and out-of-state [parties]." Id.
37. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
38. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 797. For a discussion of the Court's analysis and
application of the balancing test in Pike, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
39. 511 U.S. 383 (1994). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Carbone,
see infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
40. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
41. See id. at 618. The law under review, chapter 363 of 1973 N.J. Laws, provided that:
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be fed to swine in the State of NewJersey, until the commissioner [of the State Department of Environmental Protection] shall
determine that such action can be permitted without endangering the
public health, safety and welfare and has promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the treatment and disposal of such waste in this
State.
Id. at 618-19 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West Supp. 1978)).
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fill capacities were inadequate to satisfy its needs, and that importa42
tion of out-of-state waste was negatively affecting its environment.

The Court held that the New Jersey law facially discriminated
against out-of-state commerce by favoring local residents and there43
fore violated the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Philadelphiain Fort GratiotSanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources,44 when
42. See id. at 625. These arguments were supported by legislative findings set
forth in the state Act which provided:
The Legislature finds and determines that... the volume of solid and
liquid waste continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment and disposal
of these wastes continues to pose an even greater threat to the quality of
the environment of New Jersey, that the available and appropriate land
fill sites within the State are being diminished, that the environment continues to be threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste which
originated or was collected outside the State, and that the public health,
safety and welfare require that the treatment and disposal within this
State of all wastes generated outside of the State be prohibited.
Id. at 625.
The New Jersey Supreme Court accepted these statements of legislative purpose as well. See id. at 625. The court was not, however, confined to these findings.
The court went on to find "that NewJersey's existing landfill sites will be exhausted
within a few years; that to go on using these sites or to develop new ones will take a
heavy environmental toll, both from pollution and from loss of scarce open lands
... " and that " ' the extension of the lifespan of existing landfills, resulting from the
exclusion of out-of-state waste, may be of crucial importance in preventing further
virgin wetlands or other undeveloped lands from being devoted to landfill purposes.'" Id.
43. See id. at 628. The PhiladelphiaCourt determined that the New Jersey law,
"[o]n its face ....
imposes on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of
conserving the State's remaining landfill space" . . . and thus, fell "squarely within
the area that the Commerce Clause puts off limits to state regulation." Id.
In an oft cited passage, the Court summarized both the purpose of the Commerce Clause and its holding when it wrote:
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or necessary
to send their waste into NewJersey for disposal, and NewJersey claims the
right to close its borders to such traffic. Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey
may find it expedient or necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania
or New York for disposal, and those States might then claim the right to
close their borders. The Commerce Clause will protect NewJersey in the
future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from the efforts by one State
to isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem
shared by all.
Id. at 629.
44. 504 U.S. 353 (1992). In Fort Gratiot, the Court was asked to decide the
constitutionality of a Michigan law which provided that solid waste produced in
another county, state, or country could not be accepted by a disposal facility unless
the receiving county authorized the acceptance. See id. Petitioner applied for and
was denied an application from St. Clair County to receive out-of-state waste at its
landfill. See id. As a result of this denial, and the effect that the "statute ... prevent[s] petitioner from receiving any solid waste that does not originate in St. Clair
County," petitioner commenced this action challenging the validity of the Michigan law pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Id.
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it held that bans on the export or import of waste were invalid. 45 In
Fort Gratiotthe Court applied the reasoning of Philadelphiaand concluded that a Michigan law prohibiting the importation of out-ofstate waste, absent congressional authorization, had the effect of allowing political subdivisions to "isolate [themselves] from the national economy." 46 The challenged law in Fort Gratiotwas similar to
the law that was challenged in Philadelphia as it facially discriminated against out-of-state parties. 47 The Fort Gratiot Court concluded that the law was discriminatory. Because Michigan could
not demonstrate that health and safety concerns could not have
been served by nondiscriminatory alternatives, the law was declared
48
unconstitutional.
The Court has also found that, like the export and import bans
found unconstitutional in Philadelphiaand Fort Gratiot, laws which
charge increased rates on out-of-state waste are likewise facially dis45. See id. at 355. The Court cited Philadelphiaas the framework which led to
its determination that the Michigan law at issue was unconstitutional. See id.
46. Id. at 361. The Court wrote that pursuant to the law's construction, all of
Michigan's 83 counties could completely isolate themselves from competition by
out-of-state parties. See id. The Michigan law under review stated in pertinent part:
A person shall not accept for disposal solid waste ...that is not generated
in the county in which the disposal area is located unless the acceptance
of solid waste ... that is not generated in the county is explicitly authorized in the approved county solid waste management plan. In order for a
disposal area to serve the disposal needs of another county, state, or
country, the service .

.

. must be explicitly authorized in the approved

solid waste management plan of the receiving county.
Id. at 357. Michigan defined "solid waste" as "garbage, rubbish, ashes, incinerator
ash, incinerator residue, street cleanings, municipal and industrial sludges, solid
commercial and solid industrial waste, and animal waste other than organic waste
generated in the production of livestock and poultry." Id. at 356 (citing MICH.
COMP. LAws § 7(1) (Supp. 1991)).
47. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 367. The Court found that, aside from the
origin of the out-of-state waste, Michigan had not identified any other reasons why
out-of-state waste should be treated differently from Michigan waste. See id. The
Court concluded that the import bans "unambiguously discriminate against interstate commerce and are appropriately characterized as protectionist measures that
cannot withstand scrutiny under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 367-68.
Michigan attempted to distinguish its law from New Jersey's, arguing that
other counties located in Michigan were treated the same as out-of-state parties.
See id. at 361-63. The Court stated that since each municipality was authorized to
enact exclusion laws which would prohibit waste from entering its borders, the
aggregate effect of all of these municipalities doing so would be no different than a
single state law like that in Philadelphia. See id. at 361 (holding that "our prior cases
teach that a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures
of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce
through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself").
48. See id. at 366. After a finding that a law is discriminatory, the burden then
shifts to the state or political subdivision to prove that the purposes of the act
could not have been served as well by available non-discriminatory alternatives.
For a discussion of this test, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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criminatory. 49 Disparities in rates were at issue in both Oregon Waste
System, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality,50 and Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt.5 1 In these cases, the Court held the

52
acts subject to the discrimination test and voided the provisions.
First, in Oregon Waste, the Oregon Legislature imposed an additional "surcharge" on the importation and disposal of out-of-state
waste. 53 In attempting to justify the surcharge, the state argued that
the fee disparity was a "compensatory tax" designed to require outof-state parties to pay their "fair share" of the "costs imposed on

Oregon by the disposal of their waste in the State." 5 4 The Court

rejected this contention by holding that this argument could only
be valid if the state could prove that, in the absence of the statute,
out-of-state parties were being charged lower fees than in-state-parties. 55 Oregon also asserted that the law was a resource protection
49. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93
(1994); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
50. 511 U.S. 93 (1994). Petitioners, Oregon Waste Systems, Inc., and Columbia Resource Company were businesses operating within Oregon which accepted
waste from out-of-state parties. See id. at 95-97. They sought review of the disparate
fee structure under both state law and the Commerce Clause. See id. at 97.
51. 504 U.S. 334 (1992). Petitioner, Chemical Waste Management, Inc., a
Delaware corporation, owned a hazardous waste facility in Emelle, Alabama. See id.
at 337. The facility was the largest hazardous waste land disposal facility in the
United States, and 90% of the tonnage it receives was imported from out-of-state.
See id. at 338. Pursuant to the imposition of increased fees on out-of-state waste,
petitioner sought declaratory relief and an injunction against the enforcement of
the Act. See id. at 339. Petitioner alleged, among other things, violations of the
Commerce Clause. See id.
52. See generally Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. 93; Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. 334.
Neither state was able to meet the burdens imposed upon it by the discrimination
test, specifically, each was unable to prove a legitimate local purpose for the different fees imposed on in-state and out-of-state parties. See generally Oregon Waste, 511
U.S. 93; Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. 334. The Court found in both cases that there was
no legitimate local concern and that less discriminatory alternatives were available
to the state parties. See generally Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. 93; Chemical Waste, 504 U.S.
334.

53. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 96. The Act provided that the surcharge would
apply to "every person who disposes of solid waste generated out-of-state in a disposal site or regional disposal site." Id. The Oregon Environmental Quality Commission set the out-of-state surcharge at $2.25 per ton as compared to the $0.85 per
ton fee established by the legislature for in-state parties. See id.
54. Id. at 102. The Court noted that it left open the possibility that a "fair
share" argument could justify the imposition of discriminatory fees on out-of-state
waste in Chemical Waste. Id. (stating that "interstate commerce may be made to
"pay its way" (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281
(1977)).
55. See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 102-04. Included in this burden is the implicit idea that although a state can require interstate commerce to pay its fair
share, it cannot "'exact[ ] more than ajust share' from interstate commerce." Id. at
102 (citing Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978)). To make the showing that a compensatory tax does not
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measure, as it would discourage importation of out-of-state waste to
conserve disposal space for in-state waste. 56 The Court held that
this justification was invalid as it was similar to the argument offered
and rejected in Philadelphia.57 Therefore, because the Court rejected both of Oregon's arguments that it had a legitimate local
purpose for imposing the regulation, the state failed to meet its
burden under the discrimination test and the act was declared
unconstitutional.

58

In Chemical Waste, the Alabama Legislature promulgated an act
which imposed a greater fee on all hazardous waste that was both
produced outside Alabama and disposed of inside Alabama. 59 The
Supreme Court found that this disparate fee structure was both discriminatory on its face, and in its effect; therefore, the state had the
burden of establishing that it had a legitimate local purpose in creating the out-of-state fee, and that that purpose could not have

exact too much, the state must establish that a "rough equivalent of an identifiable
and 'substantially similar' tax" is imposed on intrastate commerce. Id. at 103 (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759-60 (1981)). Therefore, a state must
first "'identif[y] ...the [intrastate tax] burden for which the State is attempting to
compensate'" and then show that the tax on interstate commerce is roughly proportionate to the burden on intrastate commerce. Id. (alterations in original) (citing Maryland, 451 U.S. at 758). Finally, the "events on which the interstate
and intrastate taxes are imposed must be . . .sufficiently similar in substance to
serve as mutually exclusive 'prox[ies] ....
'" Id. (citing Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467
U.S. 638, 643 (1984)). The Court held that Oregon failed to "identify a specific
charge in intrastate commerce equal to or exceeding the surcharge," and thus, its
discriminatory surcharge did not fit into the justification for discriminatory acts as
outlined in Chemical Waste. Id. at 104.
56. See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 102-04.
57. See id. at 107. In fact, the Court did not recognize that the state's conservation argument was distinct from the state's first argument. See id. It stated that
Oregon's second argument was merely re-characterizing the first argument as resource protectionism. See id. The Court continued to say that resource conservation is not a legitimate local purpose. See id. It explained that "discouraging the
flow of out-of-state waste into Oregon landfills .. .hardly advances respondents'
cause . . . '[a] State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access
over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders.'"
Id. (citing Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 627).
58. See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99. The Court summarized its reasons for
rejecting the state's argument by focusing on the simple effects of the surcharge.
See id. The Court stated "that the differential charge favors shippers of Oregon
waste over their counterparts handling waste generated in other states. In making
that geographical distinction, the surcharge patently discriminates against interstate commerce." Id. at 100.
59. See Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. at 338. The Act provided that "[flor waste and
substances which are generated outside of Alabama and disposed of at a commercial site for the disposal of hazardous waste or hazardous substances in Alabama,
an additional fee shall be levied at the rate of $72.00 per ton." Id. at 338-39 (quoting ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(b) (1990)).
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been achieved through nondiscriminatory alternatives. 6 0 Alabama
asserted that its legitimate local concerns included protection of citizen health, conservation of the environment, and equalizing the
financial burden by requiring that out-of-state parties pay their fair
share of dumping waste within Alabama. 6 1 Similar to its holding in
Oregon Waste, the Chemical Waste Court rejected these arguments as
non-legitimate local purposes. 6 2 The Court further concluded that
Alabama had numerous nondiscriminatory alternatives at its dispo63
sal, and thus, the fee structure violated the Commerce Clause.

60. See Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. at 342 (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). The Court continued to state that the
effect of determining that an act is discriminatory, at a minimum, is to subject it to
"the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence
of nondiscriminatory alternatives." Id. at 342-43 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322, 337 (1979)).
61. See Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. at 343. The Alabama Supreme Court stated
that the "legitimate local purposes" of the act were:
The Additional Fee serves these legitimate local purposes that cannot be
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives: (1) protection of the health and safety of the citizens of Alabama from toxic
substances; (2) conservation of the environment and the state's natural
resources; (3) provision for compensatory revenue for the costs and burdens that out-of-state waste generators impose by dumping their hazardous waste in Alabama; (4) reduction of the overall flow of wastes traveling
on the state's highways, which flow creates a greater risk to the health and
safety of the state's citizens.
Id.
62. See id. at 343-44. The Court said that Alabama had not offered more than
rhetoric in its attempts to explain its legitimate local purposes for imposing the
out-of-state fee. See id. at 343. In quoting the trial court, the Supreme Court noted
that "[a] Ithough the Legislature imposed an additional fee ...on waste generated
outside Alabama, there is absolutely no evidence before this Court that waste generated outside Alabama is more dangerous than waste generated in Alabama." Id.
at 343-44. As a result, the Court concluded that the only reason that the fee was
imposed was because of the origin of the waste. See id.
63. See id. at 344-46. The Court held that the concern of the State, that increased volumes of hazardous waste pose greater health hazards, could have been
addressed by nondiscriminatory alternatives. See id. at 344-45. The alternatives
listed were the imposition of per-ton fees on all hazardous waste, a per-mile fee
imposed on all vehicles which transport hazardous waste on Alabama roads and a
general cap on the amount of waste that the facility could accept from all sources.
See id. at 345. Regarding Alabama's allegation that the fee's purpose was grounded
in environmental and health concerns, the Court noted that these concerns do
.not vary with the point of origin of the waste ..."and that these concerns could
have been achieved with increased regulation and monitoring of the transportation and disposal of waste. Id. at 34546. As a result of these findings, the Court
concluded that the fee was "'an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State'
with most of the burden of slowing the flow of waste into the Emelle facility." Id. at
346 (citing Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629).
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C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown

In C & A Carbone,Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,64 the Court determined the constitutionality of a flow control ordinance requiring
waste to pass through a single designated transfer station. 65 Clarkstown had contracted with a private party to construct the facility in
return for Clarkstown's promise to deliver 120,000 tons of waste, or
to pay the equivalent amount of fees for that amount of waste. 66 To
ensure that the facility received the required tonnage to avoid having to make up the shortfall, Clarkstown passed the ordinance at
issue which required all nonhazardous waste generated in, or pass67
ing through, the municipality to be shipped to the facility.
C & A Carbone, a local company which provided services similar to those provided by the designated facility, violated the ordinance when it bypassed the transfer station by sending waste to an
out-of-state facility charging lower tipping fees. 68 After Clarkstown
learned about this action, it sued Carbone for violations of the ordinance, and sought to enjoin them from patronizing the non-desig69
nated facility.
64. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
65. See id. at 386. The ordinance required all nonhazardous waste, generated
either within or outside the town, brought into the town to pass through the designated transfer station. See id. at 387. Upon receiving the waste, the facility would
separate the recyclable waste from the non-recyclable waste. See id. The recyclable
waste was forwarded to a recycling facility and the non-recyclable waste was sent to
either a landfill or incinerator. See id. The Court held the ordinance unconstitutional because it "depriv[es] competitors, including out-of-state firms... access to
a local market." Id. at 386.
66. See id. at 387. The price to construct the transfer facility was $1.4 million.
See id. The tipping fee that was established by the contractor to finance the costly
facility was $81 per ton, well above the market rate for similar services. See id.
67. See id. Because of the high tipping fees, Clarkstown feared that it would
not meet the guaranteed minimum tonnage if it relied solely on market forces to
attract waste to the facility. See id. Due to the incentive of the municipality to avoid
paying any difference between the promised amount and the actual delivered
amount, Clarkstown created a mechanism to guarantee that waste would be delivered to the facility. See id. The result was the ordinance under review. See id. It
required all nonhazardous waste within the municipality to be shipped to the designated transfer station. See id. at 388.
68. See id. at 388. Carbone maintained a facility in Clarkstown which separated recyclable from non-recyclable waste and prepared the wastes for subsequent
shipping. See id. at 387-88. Therefore, the services rendered by Carbone were
much like those rendered at the designated transfer station. See id. at 388.
Although the ordinance allowed Carbone to continue receiving waste, it required
it to ship the non-recyclable product of its sorting process to the designated facility
to be sorted again. See id. The effect of this was to "require[ ] Carbone to pay a
tipping fee on trash that Carbone has already sorted." Id.
69. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 388. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in
federal court to enjoin the enforcement of the flow control ordinance. See id. The
federal district court granted the injunction. See id. (citing C.A. Carbone, Inc. v.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

21

246

VILLANoVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
IX: p. 225
Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,
Vol. JouRNAL
9, Iss. 1 [1998], Art.[Vol.
6

In an opinion which has been criticized as broad and ambiguous, the Court invalidated the ordinance as a violation of the Commerce Clause. 70 In sum, the Court concluded that the ordinance
regulated interstate commerce 71 and provided a benefit on a single
in-state party. 72 Additionally, the Court held that the legitimate

purposes of the ordinance could have been achieved through alter73
native nondiscriminatory means.

Clarkstown, 770 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). The ordinance was later declared
constitutional and Carbone was enjoined from violating the ordinance. See id.

The appellate court found that the ordinance was not discriminatory and affirmed
the district court's holding. See id. at 388-89. The New York Court of Appeals
denied Carbone's appeal. See id.
70. For a discussion of the differing interpretations of the Carbone decision,
see infra notes 74-80 & 174-75 and accompanying text.
71. See Carbone,511 U.S. at 389-90. The Court rejected the town's argument
that the ordinance was internal in scope only. See id. The Court held that "[w]hile
the immediate effect of the ordinance is to direct local transport of solid waste to a
designated site within the local jurisdiction, its economic effects are interstate in
reach." Id. at 389. The Court explained this holding in stating:
The Carbone facility in Clarkstown receives and processes waste from
places other than Clarkstown, including from out of State. By requiring
Carbone to send the nonrecyclable portion of this waste to the [designated] transfer station at an additional cost, the flow control ordinance
drives up the cost for out-of-state interests to dispose of their solid waste.
Furthermore, even as to waste originant in Clarkstown, the ordinance
prevents everyone except the favored local operator from performing the
initial processing step. The ordinance thus deprives out-of-state businesses of access to a local market.
Id. at 389.
72. See id. at 391-92. The Court held that "the flow control ordinance discriminates, for it allows only the favored operator to process waste within the limits of
the town." Id. at 391. Further, the Court compared the ordinance under review to
the acts that it had held invalid for imposing a benefit on in-state parties. See id.
The Court stated the following about the flow control ordinance:
[It] hoards waste, and the demand to get rid of it, for the benefit of the
preferred facility. The only conceivable distinction from the [cases cited]
above is that the flow control ordinance favors a single local proprietor.
But this difference just makes the protectionist effect of the ordinance
more acute. In Dean Milk, the local processing requirement at least permitted pasteurizers within five miles of the city to compete. An out-ofstate pasteurizer who wanted access to that market might have built a
pasteurizing facility within the radius. The flow control ordinance at issue here squelches competition in the waste-processing service altogether, leaving no room for investment from outside.
Id. at 392.
73. See id. at 393. Although the Court stated that "Clarkstown had any
number of nondiscriminatory alternatives for addressing the health and environment problems alleged to justify the ordinance in question," only one was suggested, uniform safety regulations. Id.
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Post-Carbone Jurisprudence

In light of the Carbonedecision, subsequent flow control decisions have reflected varying interpretations of the scope of the
holding.74 Courts have interpreted the scope of Carbone's reach
with varying approaches. Many courts have adopted a broad interpretation of Carbone, thereby prohibiting flow control measures altogether. 75 Other courts have adopted a narrower interpretation
and have held that some flow control ordinances are still permissible. 76 Because great difficulty exists in determining the precise
74. See, e.g., Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc. v. City of Bethlehem, No. CIV.A.945928, 1994 WL 613674 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1994). In Grand Centra4 the district court
denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, in part, because of the
district court's confusion over how the Third Circuit would interpret Carbone. See
id. at *3. When the court, in an opinion written by Judge Rendell, issued its decision in the Grand Central case, the Third Circuit was on the verge of determining
the meaning of Carbonein Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling Inc. v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders. See id. Judge Rendell denied the request for a preliminary
injunction, in part, because of her belief that the Third Circuit's decision in Atlantic Coast would have a large impact on the issues presented in Grand Central. See id.
75. See Turner, supranote 14, at 220 (stating " [t] he large portion of... courts
have either permanently or preliminarily prohibited the enforcement of flow control measures" and this interpretative approach to Carboneis unmistakable judicial
trend) (citing as support Mid-American Waste Sys., Inc. v. Fisher, No. C-2-94-493,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20996 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 1994); Empire Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 645 A.2d 413 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); Southcentral Pennsylvania Waste Haulers Ass'n v. Besford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste Auth., 877
F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1995)).
The Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works also expressed
this same broad interpretation of Carbonewhen it stated that "the supreme [sic]
Court's ruling in the Carbonecase has made it evidently clear that, absent Congressional action, the exercise of flow control by States and political subdivisions is
unconstitutional." S.REP. No. 104-52, at 8 (1995) (general statement of the Committee on Environment and Public Works).
The U.S. Senate Democratic Policy Committee Legislative Bulletin similarly
adopted a broad interpretation of Carbonewhen it summarized the purpose of Senate Bill 534, the Interstate Transportation of Municipal Solid Waste Act, as being
"developed in response to the Supreme Court's invalidation of State regulation of
the interstate transportation of municipal solid waste." U.S. Senate DemocraticPolicy
Committee Legislative Bulletin (visited February, 1996) <http://www.senate.gov/
-dpc/lb-l 1.html>.
76. See Turner, supra note 14, at 221-22 (stating despite trend to invalidate
flow control plans pursuant to Carbone, some courts have upheld constitutionality
of flow control plans) (citing as support Vince Refuse Servs., Inc. v. Clark County
Solid Waste Management Dist., No. C-3-93-319, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5008 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 7, 1995); Delaware County v. Raymond T. Opdenaker & Sons, 652 A.2d
434 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc. v. City of Bethlehem, No.
94-5928, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15825 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1994); Harvey & Harvey,
Inc. v. County of Chester, No. 94-3615, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13738 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
27, 1994), vacated, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995); Waste Management, Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, No. 3-94-0411 (M.D. Tenn. May
17, 1995), rev'd in part, Nos. 95-5863, 95-5900, 1997 WL 690850 (6th Cir. 1997)).
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holding of Carbone,courts have had divergent rulings when examining the constitutionality of flow control measures.
77
In general, courts construe Carbone's reach quite broadly.
For example, one commentator cites the district court decision in
Tri-County Industries, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental

Resources as the high water mark for broad flow control holdings. 78
Although the case was ultimately heard by the Third Circuit and
remanded for reconsideration, 79 the district court, having the benefit of Carbone, declared the ordinance discriminatory simply because
the designated waste facility was located in-state. 80
The Third Circuit added to the lack of uniformity of Commerce Clause decisions in the Post-Carboneera in Harvey & Harvey,
Inc. v. County of Chester.81 In Harvey, the Third Circuit was asked to

decide the constitutional validity of two county ordinances which
required local waste to be deposited at in-state sites. 82 Rather than
focusing on the challenged ordinances, as all courts had done in
the past, the Harvey court examined the process by which the counties designated the waste facilities.83 This clear departure from
traditional Commerce Clause analysis further reduced the uniformity in the evaluation of flow control acts in the Post-Carboneera. In
Harvey, the Third Circuit decided two cases which were consoli84
dated upon appeal.
77. See Turner, supra note 14, at 220 (stating a broad interpretation of Carbone is "unmistakable judicial trend"); Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at
391 (stating that "courts are generally construing [Carbone] broadly, perhaps even
more broadly than the Court anticipated").
78. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 391-92.
79. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
80. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 391-92.
81. 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
82. See id.
83. See id. For a discussion of other courts' Commerce Clause inquiries, and
the absence of an examination of the designation process, see supra notes 39-80
and accompanying text.
84. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 791. Since both cases presented Commerce Clause
challenges to similar flow control plans, the courtjoined the two cases and decided
them in a single opinion. See id. After hearing oral arguments, the appellate court
remanded both cases to their respective district courts. See id. The district courts
were instructed to conduct additional fact finding before making conclusions of
law not inconsistent with the Third Circuit's decision. See id.
In Harvey, plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement
of the Chester County regulations. See id. at 795. The court denied the motions
because plaintiff did not adequately prove that it was suffering "immediate and
irreparable harm." Id. Before trial, the district court granted the defendant's motion to apply the balancing test established in Pike. See id. The court reasoned that
the Chester County Plan did not discriminate on its face, effect or purpose, and as
a result, a strict scrutiny test was not appropriate. See id. Therefore, the Pike balancing test was the appropriate test for evaluating the plan's validity under the
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FACTS

The Chester County Case

In response to the daunting waste disposal problems and their
associated environmental impacts, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act of 1988 (Pennsylvania Act). 85 The Pennsylvania Act
requires long-term county waste planning and authorizes counties
to adopt flow control ordinances. 86 In response to the Pennsylvania
Dormant Commerce Clause. See id. The plaintiff then conceded that it could not
prevail under the Pike test. See id. For a discussion of discrimination and Pike balancing test, see supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. In Tri-County Indus. v.
County of Mercer, the district court held the Mercer County Plan unconstitutional
on the grounds that the plan "operated to impermissibly burden interstate commerce" because it required "that all waste generated within the county be taken to
the designated landfill in Butler County." Harvey, 68 F.3d at 796.
85. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 4000.101-4000.1904 (West Supp. 1997). The
legislature promulgated the Pennsylvania Act to "[p]rotect the public health,
safety and welfare from the short and long-term dangers of transportation, processing, treatment, storage and disposal of municipal waste." Id. § 4000.102(b) (3).
The legislature declared that " [ i] mproper municipal waste practices create public
health hazards, environmental pollution and economic loss, and cause irreparable
harm to the public health, safety and welfare." Id. § 4000.102(a) (1). The legislature also found that the problems of waste planning and disposal were so pervasive
that "[v] irtually every county in this Commonwealth will have to replace existing
municipal waste processing and disposal facilities over the next decade." Id.
§ 4000.102(a) (3). The legislature further determined that "[i]t is necessary to give
counties the primary responsibility to plan for the processing and disposal of municipal waste generated within their boundaries to insure the timely development
of needed processing and disposal facilities." Id. § 4000.102(a) (5). The declaration of policy and goals of the Act further reveal that:
Authorizing counties to control the flow of municipal waste is necessary,
among other reasons, to guarantee the long-term economic viability of
resource recovery facilities and municipal waste landfills to ensure that
such facilities and landfills can be financed, to moderate the costs of such
facilities and landfills over the long term, to protect existing capacity and
to assist in the development of markets for recyclable materials by guaranteeing a steady flow of such materials.
Id. § 4000.102 (a) (10). For a discussion of the problems which have plagued waste
facilities and waste management plans, see supra notes 3-16 and accompanying
text.
86. See id. § 4000.102(a) (2). The Act authorizes the counties to determine,
for ten year intervals, which facilities will dispose and process their waste. See id.
§ 4000.303(e). It further requires counties to consider alternative plans and to
provide assurances that the designation process was fair, open and competitive. See
id. § 4000.502(f) (2). The Act does not require the designated facility to be located
within the county or the state, but in-county sites should be given first choice. See
id. § 4000.102(a) (6). The final site and its designation process are assembled into
a municipal waste management plan which undergoes county, public and administrative scrutiny. See id. § 4000.502(f). During the formulation stages, a County Advisory Committee first reviews the management plan. See id. § 4000.503(a). The
committee is comprised of "all classes of municipalities within the county, citizen
organizations, industry, the private solid waste industry operating within the
county, the private recycling or scrap metal processing industry operating within
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Act, Chester County appointed the Chester County Act 101 Municipal Waste Advisory Committee (Committee) to evaluate potential
service providers for their waste management system.8 7 In evaluating potential service providers, the Committee attended four waste
disposal and processing facility site inspections both in and out-of88
state.
the county, the county recycling coordinator, if one exists, and any other persons
deemed appropriate by the county." Id. The committee reviews the plan for potential problems and desired alterations from which the committee can formally
recommend changes. See id.
The county is also required to re-submit any plan to the County Advisory Committee at least thirty days before it submits the plan to the Department of Environmental Resources (DER). See id. § 4000.503(d). The county must then make the
plan available for a ninety day public review and comment period during which
the county must hold at least one public hearing. See id. § 4000.503(c).
At this point the plan must be ratified by at least one half of the municipalities
representing a minimum of fifty percent of the population. See id. § 4000.503(d).
If the plan receives the required approval, it is submitted to the DER for approval.
See id. After submission, any party objecting to the plan may appeal to the Environmental Hearing Board. See id. This plan may be revised by the county at any time.
Id. § 4000.303; 25 PA. CODE § 272.251 (a) (1)&(b) (1997). The county is required,
however, to revise the plan at least three years prior to the time that the capacity of
the county is to be exhausted. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.501(b) (1).

87. See Chester County, Pa., Chester County Flow Control Ordinance No. 92-1
(Sept. 25, 1990). Specifically, the ordinance provides:
WHEREAS, the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act ofJuly 28, 1988 .

.

. requires counties to prepare a plan for Mu-

nicipal Waste management systems within their boundaries, and
WHEREAS .... Act 101 requires counties to provide adequate permitted
waste processing and disposal capacity for at least ten years, and . . .
WHEREAS ....
The Chester County Board of Commissioners adopted
Chester County Act 101 Municipal Waste Management Plan... In accordance
with the requirements of... Act 101, Chester County does 'hereby enact
and ordain as follows.
Id.
In discussing the Chester County case, the court stated: "We do not doubt that
the county's legitimate intention to comply with the Act motivated its adoption of
flow control." Harvey, 68 F.3d at 805. Additionally, the court wrote, "[t] here are
indications that the state authority, the DER, was going to withhold approval of the
plan unless it included flow control." Id. at 805, n.13.
Similarly, the Third Circuit stated that "[a]s with Harvey, the flow control
scheme in [the Ti-County] case also results from the interaction of Pennsylvania's
Act 101 with the County's waste control plan and its implementing ordinances."
Id. at 808.
88. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 794. The Committee evaluated sites during day-long
presentations in Philadelphia, Chester County, Montgomery County, and York,
Pennsylvania, as well as Baltimore, Maryland. See id. The committee also attended
a presentation on the Westinghouse resource recovery facility in the City of
Chester, Pennsylvania. See id.
Following these site visits, the Committee held thirteen publicly advertised
meetings to evaluate the Chester County Plan. See id. These meetings were advertised in the Daily Local News, a paper with an approximate daily circulation of
45,000. See id. On May 29 and 31, 1990, the Committee held a public hearing to
solicit comment on the proposed plan. See id. The record does not reveal the
meetings' attendance or how it was advertised. See id. Further, the record is silent
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The final version of the ordinance established a comprehensive waste disposal plan which designated the Southeastern Chester
County Refuse Authority Sanitary Landfill (SECCRA), the Chester
County Solid Waste Authority Lanchester Sanitary Landfill
(Lanchester) and the Pottstown Landfill (Pottstown), as the primary facilities to serve Chester County.8 9 The plan further divided
the County into two service areas, each area being serviced by one
of the primary sites. It provided that waste originating within those
service areas had to be disposed of at the respective site. 90 Both the
plan and Department of Environmental Regulations (DER) guidelines provided for an amendment and revision process. 9 1 Neither
the plan nor the regulations contained language prohibiting out-ofstate facilities from participating in the application process or from
being designated as a disposal site. 9 2 The County, however, stated
as to why Harvey did not participate in the process. See id. Additionally, Harvey
did not have any business in the area before 1990. See id. After making revisions in
response to public debate, the Commission adopted a plan on September 25,
1990, which did not mandate flow control. See id. However, DER notified Chester
County that it would not approve the plan unless it adopted a flow control element
within the ordinance. See id. In response to DER's demand, Chester County added a flow control element to its waste plan and DER granted final approval on
April 11, 1991. See id.
89. See id. These sites were selected over other sites because "the haulers of
trash in the County had established a historic pattern of disposal at these landfills."
Id. The County had a financial interest in the Lanchester site. See id. The
Lanchester site was purchased with $42.55 million in Authority bonds guaranteed
by Chester County. See id. The county later "guaranteed an additional $41.5 million in Authority debt, secured a $9.2 million letter of credit and agreed to provide
the Authority with an additional $9.5 million for landfill projects." Id.
90. See id. at 794-95.
91. See Chester County, Pa., Chester County Flow Control Ordinance No. 92-1
(Sept. 25, 1990). Specifically, § 7(a) of Chester County Flow Control Ordinance
No. 92-1 states: "The County may, from time to time, establish Service Areas by
resolution in accordance with the plan and any amendments thereto." Id. Pennsylvania's regulations provide that "[a] county with an approved municipal waste
management plan may submit a revised plan to the Department in accordance
with this subchapter at any . . . time." 25 PA. CODE § 272.251(b) (1997).
92. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 795. The court noted that "[t]he terms of the ordinance permit amendment to designate other facilities and do not prohibit out-ofstate facilities from applying." Id. In an accompanying footnote, the court highlighted the definition of a "designated facility" as presented in the ordinance. Id.
at 795 n.7. The Ordinance defined a designated facility as follows:
The Lanchester Sanitary Landfill owned and operated by the Chester
County Solid Waste Authority, located in Honeybrook Township, Chester
County and Caernarvon and Salisbury Townships, Lancaster County; the
Southeastern Chester County Refuse Authority Sanitary Landfill, located
in London Grove Township, Chester County; the Pottstown Landfill
owned and operated by SCA Services of Pennsylvania, Inc., located in
West Pottsgrove Township, Montgomery County; or any other County designated Municipal Waste Processing or disposalfacility.
Id. (emphasis added).
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that any landfill that would withdraw revenue from the Lanchester
93
Site would be opposed.
In response to the Chester County Plan, Harvey & Harvey, Inc.
(Harvey), a Delaware corporation, filed suit against Chester County
challenging the constitutionality of the flow control ordinance pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 94 Harvey alleged that "the regulations isolate the County from the interstate solid waste market by
prohibiting the export of locally generated waste to out-of-state disposal and by similarly prohibiting the import of waste processing
95
and disposal services from out-of-state."
The district court concluded that Chester County's ordinance
did "'not discriminate on its face nor [was] the primary purpose or
effect' to discriminate. '96 After determining there was no discrimination, the district court concluded that the Pike balancing test
should also be applied. 9 7 Harvey acknowledged that it could not
meet its burden under this test.9 8
B.

The Mercer County Case

In the second of the two combined cases, Mercer County
adopted an ordinance which designated only one facility to fulfill
its waste disposal and processing needs. 99 In determining which
service provider would be awarded the contract, Mercer County developed specifications which it advertised nationwide, resulting in
twenty-three parties requesting proposal application materials. 10 0
After the application and bidding process was complete, Waste
Management of Pennsylvania, which managed a landfill in Butler
County, Pennsylvania, was awarded the Mercer County contract. 10 1
93. See id. at 795.
94. See id.; see also U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a discussion of the Commerce Clause, see supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
95. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 795.
96. Id. at 803.
97. Id. at 791. For a discussion of the tests used to determine whether a law
violates the Commerce Clause, see supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
98. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 791.
99. See id. at 807. The designated site, was not located within Mercer County,
but was located in Pennsylvania. See id.
100. See id. at 808. Parties submitted applications from Pennsylvania, Ohio,
New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Minnesota, and Louisiana. See id.
101. See id. at 795. All of the companies that submitted final bids for the contract maintained facilities in Pennsylvania. See id. at 808. Additionally, none of the
out-of-state parties which requested proposal packages actually submitted a bid.
See id. The Third Circuit questioned the high attrition rate for out-of-state submissions and suggested that this attrition might possibly have been caused by elements
of the designation process which discouraged out-of-state parties. See id. (stating
although designation process appeared to be fair, "on remand Tri-County may be
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The Mercer ordinance provided that the landfill designated in the
10 2
county plan may be amended by the county waste authority.
The Mercer Ordinance required that all waste generated
within its borders was to be hauled to the designated site in Butler
County.10 3 The Ordinance also mandated that haulers obtain a license to haul waste within the county. 10 4 Further, the ordinance
imposed penalties against haulers who dumped waste in any facility
10 5
not specified in the county plan.
Tri-County Industries, Inc. (Tri-County), was a Pennsylvania
corporation licensed to haul waste for Mercer County. 106 Although
the county plan required haulers to transport waste only to the Butler site, Tri-County deposited some of its waste in Ohio facilities
charging lower tipping fees.' 0 7 As a result, the Mercer County Solid
Waste Authority notified Tri-County that a license revocation hearing was being held for Tri-County's failure to comply with the Mercer ordinance.10 8 Tri-County responded by filing an action for
declaratory relief, seeking to establish that the Mercer ordinance
violated the Commerce Clause. 10 9
The district court concluded that the Mercer ordinance was
discriminatory, thus subjecting the ordinance to strict scrutiny. n 0
The district court concluded that the plan was impermissible because it impeded interstate commerce and was therefore in violation of the Commerce Clause."'

able to identify specifications of the bid or decisional criteria with a discriminatory
effect").
102. See id. at 809 n.18. The ordinance stated: "All Municipal Waste shall be
transported to and delivered to the Facility designated by MCSWA [Mercer County
Solid Waste Authority] from time to time...." Id.
103. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 796.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 796. Specifically, the penalty threatened to be imposed on TriCounty for noncompliance was license revocation. See id.
106. See id. at 795.
107. See id. at 796. Approximately 500 tons of the 600 to 900 tons that TriCounty hauled per month were dumped at the alternative non-designated Ohio
facilities. See id. The Butler facility charged a tipping fee of $35.00 per ton
whereas the Ohio tipping fee ranged from $17.20 to $27.95 per ton. See id.
108. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 796.
109. See id. at 796. In addition to raising alleged Commerce Clause violations,
Tri-County requested a permanent injunction against Mercer County to preclude
the enforcement of the threatened license revocation. See id.
110. See id. at 796.
111. See id. at 796, 807. The district court held that, "[i]t is the designation of
a single, in-state landfill, rather than the process by which it was designated, that
has resulted in the discrimination against interstate commerce." Id. at 807.
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A.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

Constitutionality of A Flow Control Ordinance Depends on
the Fairness of the Designation Process

The Third Circuit analyzed general Commerce Clause jurisprudence before specifically evaluating the Chester County and Mercer
County cases. 112 After reviewing the Supreme Court's holding in
Carbone,113 its own precedent in Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,114 and other circuit court holdings, the
Third Circuit derived a general summary of the applicable princi1 15
ples governing the constitutionality of flow control plans.
Based on those cases, the Third Circuit reasoned that the most
appropriate method for determining whether a violation of the
Commerce Clause had occurred was to focus on the process which
the municipality employed in selecting a particular waste service
provider.11 6 Additionally, the court defined the requisite burdens
of proof and clarified the legal standards necessary to test the constitutionality of the Chester and Mercer ordinances. 117 The court
112. See id. at 796-98. The Third Circuit first enunciated the general purpose

and applicability of the Commerce Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
See id. at 798-800. " [ T] he Commerce Clause is designed to eliminate protectionist
restrictions on interstate trade which typically characterize international trade,
such as embargoes, quotas, and tariffs." Id. at 797 (quoting Norfolk S. Corp., v.

Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 399 (3d Cir. 1987)).
113. For a discussion of C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, see supra
notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
114. 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995).
115. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 798-802.
116. See id. at 801-03. The court asserted that a local act is invalid where it
categorically or facially discriminates. See id. at 801. The court noted that where
discrimination is not obvious, three factors should be considered in determining a
plan's constitutional validity. See id. Specifically, the court wrote:
To determine whether these flow control schemes actually discriminate
against interstate commerce (triggering strict scrutiny analysis) the court
must closely examine: (1) the designation process; (2) the duration of
the designation; (3) the likelihood of an amendment to add alternative
sites, for signs that out-of-state bidders do not in practice enjoy equal access to the local market.
Id.
117. See id. at 802-03. The court stated that the burden of proving that an act
discriminates against interstate commerce rests on the challenging party. See id. at
802 (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336). For the challenging party to meet its initial
burden, he must establish that the designation process favors in-state parties in
either purpose or effect. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 802. Purposeful or effective discrimination can be shown with "direct evidence of favoritism," like corrupt payments, evidence that a designation was given because the county or municipality
sought to protect one of its own investments, or excessively long contracts that
designate in-state parties as service providers. See id.
If the challenging party meets its burden of proof, the state can then rebut the
evidence with a showing that the "designation process was open, fair, and competi-
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then applied those principles to the Chester and Mercer County
ordinances.
The Chester County Case

1.

The Third Circuit determined that the district court erred in
applying the Pike balancing test to the Chester County case.' 18 The
Third Circuit found that the discrimination test was the proper
level of scrutiny to be applied to the Chester Ordinance, and thus,
the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision holding that
the process of selecting and amending the county plan was not sufficiently fair.1 19 The case was remanded for application of the cor1 20
rect law, consistent with the Third Circuit's decision.
After determining that the district court committed reversible
error, the Third Circuit discussed the arguments presented by Harvey, the waste hauler. Harvey's first argument alleged that the entire flow control scheme was facially discriminatory because it only
12 1
named the in-state SEECRA, Lanchester and Pottstown sites.
The court rejected this argument, stating that local governments
have the authority to contract with a limited number of businesses,
and therefore, the designation of three facilities in the Chester
five, i.e., determined by objective criteria which do not have the effect of favoring
in-state interests." Id. at 802-03. Consideration of the fairness of the process
should include, but is not limited to, "solicitation, selection criteria, evaluation of
bidders.. .

."

Id. at 803.

If the state cannot meet this burden, it must then overcome the strict scrutiny
burden. See id. Under strict scrutiny, "the burden falls on the State to demonstrate
both that the statute 'serves a legitimate local purpose,' and that this purpose
could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means." Id. (citing
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986)).
118. See id. at 803-09. The Third Circuit wrote that the district court misunderstood the tests which the ordinance must pass. See id. at 803. The Third Circuit
stated that "[i]n granting judgment for Chester County, the district court determined that the Ordinance 'does not discriminate on its face nor is the primary
purpose or effect' to discriminate. The court, however, demanded too much, for
in order to find a [D]ormant Commerce Clause violation there is no requirement
that discrimination must be the 'primary' purpose or effect." Id. The Third Circuit determined that this error was enough to warrant setting aside the lower
court's determination. See id.
The Third Circuit further held that the balancing test may have been applied
in error because there was strong evidence that the act was discriminatory. See id.
This determination was made due to the county's designation process which appeared to be closed to out-of-state parties. See id. The court held that the lower
court ignored evidence regarding the designation process which would likely have
required an examination of the Chester Ordinance under the discrimination test.
See id.
119. See id. at 807.
120. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 807.
121. See id. at 803.
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County plan was not facially discriminatory. 1 22 The court continued to reason that such an argument "would require a local government to select out-of-state sites, irrespective of their merits, in order
123
to withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny."'
Harvey's second argument alleged that the Chester County ordinance resembled export/import bans which have been subjected
to repeated invalidation by many circuit courts and the Supreme
Court. 1 24 The court disposed of this argument stating that, unlike

here, the precedent invalidating export/import ordinances explicitly bans out-of-state interests from participating in the local
25
market.'
After dismissing Harvey's arguments, the court stated that the
Chester ordinance could be deemed unconstitutional if either the
Pennsylvania Act or the Chester County Act 101 Municipal Waste
Management Plan favored in-state parties. 126 The court then evaluated the Pennsylvania Act and the Chester ordinance to determine
whether the county had violated the Commerce Clause.' 27 More
specifically, the Third Circuit examined the Chester County plan's
designation and amendment processes as well as the economic
motivations that the county may have had when selecting the in128
state sites.
In analyzing the Pennsylvania Act, the court noted that flow
control measures were only authorized, not required. 129 The court
discovered that the Pennsylvania Act contained elements which in122. See id. The court likened this authority to the power of a municipality in
the public utility context. See id. A municipality, pursuant to its police powers, may
designate monopolistic contracts to service the locality. See id. This view is further
bolstered by the fact that police powers are at their "strongest in the health and
safety area." See id.
123. See id. at 804.
124. See id. at 804.
125. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 804.
126. See id. at 804. In distinguishing the present case from those that explicitly banned out-of-state interests, the court clarified that it was not suggesting that
explicit or facial discrimination was the only type of discrimination which is unconstitutional. See id. The court reiterated its opinion that, in addition to a showing of
facial discrimination, a showing of discriminatory effect is enough to trigger strict
scrutiny under the discrimination test. See id.
127. See id. at 793-95, 804.
128. See id. at 805-07. For a discussion of the court's analysis of Chester
County's designation process, see infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the court's analysis of Chester County's amendment process, see infta notes 140-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the potential economic motives that Chester County had in designating the waste sites, see infra
notes 14348 and accompanying text.
129. See id. at 804 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 4000.303(a)-(e) (West

Supp. 1997)). This section defined the "[plowers and duties of counties" as:
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dicated the need for a fair and open process in determining waste
sites, while requiring the county to give preferential status to disposal sites within the county. 13 0 Although the Third Circuit ultimately
(a) Primary responsibility of county. - Each county shall have the power
and its duty shall be to insure the availability of adequate permitted
processing and disposal capacity for the municipal waste which is
generated within its boundaries. As part of this power, a county:
(1) May require all persons to obtain licenses to collect and transport municipal waste subject to the plan to a municipal waste
processing or disposal facility designated pursuant to subsection

(e).
(2) Shall have the power and duty to implement its approved plan,
including a plan approved under section 501 (b), as it relates to
the processing and disposal of municipal waste generated within
its boundaries.
(3) May plan for the processing and disposal of municipal waste generated outside its boundaries and to implement its approved
plan as it relates to the processing and disposal of such waste.
(4) May adopt ordinances, resolutions, regulations and standards for
the recycling of municipal waste or source-separated recyclable
material ....
(5) May prohibit the siting of additional resource recovery facilities
within its geographic boundaries where any additional resource
recovery facility is inconsistent with the county plan ....
(b) Joint planning. - Any two or more counties may adopt and implement a single municipal waste management plan for the municipal
waste generated within the combined area of the counties.
(c) Ordinances and resolutions. - In carrying out its duties under this
section, a county may adopt ordinances, resolutions, regulations and
standards for the processing and disposal of municipal waste, which
shall not be less stringent than, and not in violation of or inconsistent
with, the provisions and purposes of the Solid Waste Management
Act, this act and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
(d) Delegation of county responsibility. - A county may enter into a
written agreement with another person pursuant to which the person undertakes to fulfill some or all of the county's responsibilities
under this act for municipal waste planning and implementation of
the approved county plan ....
(e) Designated sites. - A county with an approved municipal waste management plan that was submitted pursuant to section 501(a), (b) or
(c) is also authorized to require that all municipal wastes generated
within its boundaries shall be processed or disposed at a designated
processing or disposal facility that is contained in the approved plan
and permitted by the department under the Solid Waste Management Act ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 4000.303(a)-(e).
130. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 804. Specifically, the court cited sections of the
plan stating:
If the plan indicates that additional processing or disposal capacity is
needed by the county, the county shall give public notice of such a determination and solicit proposals and recommendations regarding facilities
and programs to provide such capacity. The county shall provide a copy
of such notice to the department, which shall cause a copy of such notice
to be published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.
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determined there was evidence that the Pennsylvania Act favored
in-state interests, the court noted that Harvey had not yet met its
burden.1 3 ' Instead, the court proceeded to examine the Chester
13 2
ordinance while remaining conscious of its earlier findings.
Next, the Third Circuit scrutinized the Chester ordinance to
determine whether the county favored in-state sites through the
plan's implementation. 13 3 The court noted that "[e]stablishing disDescribe alternative facilities or programs, including, but not limited to,
waste reduction, recycling, or resource recovery facilities or programs,
that were considered and provide reasonable assurances that the county
utilized a fair, open and competitive process for selecting such facilities
or programs from among alternatives which were suggested to the
county.
Review and comment. - Prior to adoption by the governing body of the
county, the county shall submit copies of the proposed plan for review
and comment to the department, all municipalities within the county, all
areawide planning agencies and the county health department, if one
exists. The county shall also make the proposed plan available for public
review and comment. The period for review and comment shall be 90
days. The county shall hold at least one public hearing on the proposed
plan during this period. The plan subsequently submitted to the governing body of the county for adoption shall be accompanied by a document containing written responses to comments made during the
comment period.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 4000.502-4000.503.
Additionally, the county was required to favor in-county sites. See Harvey, 68
F.3d at 804. Pennsylvania law stated that "[p]roper and adequate processing and
disposal of municipal waste generated within a county requires the generating
county to give first choice to new processing and disposal sites located within that
county." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.102(6). Similarly, the court noted language
of the Act which stated that:
The plan shall identify the general location within a county where each
municipal waste processing or disposal facility and each recycling program identified in subsection (f) will be located, and either identify the
site of each facility if the site has already been chosen or explain how the
site will be chosen. For any facility that is proposed to be located outside
the county, the plan shall explain in detail the reasons for selecting such
a facility.
Id. § 4 0 0 0 .5 02(g). Regarding these provisions, the court stated that "[b]y imposing an incremental administrative burden on counties attempting to designate a
facility outside its borders, these provisions clearly express a preference that counties use sites within their borders." See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 804.
131. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 810. The court pointed out that Harvey did not
attack the Pennsylvania Act directly and did not rely on the passages indicating instate favoritism in making its case. See id. at 804.
132. See id. The court concluded that even though Harvey did not rely on the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Act when attempting to allege discrimination, a
finding that the Act tended to prove discrimination did not end the inquiry. See id.
Rather, the court simply kept the provisions tending to favor in-state parties in
mind as it evaluated Harvey's arguments as to why the ordinance was discriminatory. See id.
133. See id. at 805. The Third Circuit stated that the designation process was
important in determining the ordinance's constitutional validity. See id. If the
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crimination requires only a demonstration that out-of-state interests
did not compete for designation on a level playing field.

' 134

There-

fore, if the ordinance were unfair to out-of-county parties, legitimate environmental concerns would not shield the ordinance from
invalidation. 135
The court initially focused on the designation process, reasoning that, if the county never considered any out-of-state landfills, as
Harvey contended, the ordinance would be deemed discriminatory. 136 In evaluating the legitimacy of this allegation, the court

noted evidence that suggested that Chester County did consider
both a Baltimore, Maryland and a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
137

site.

The court then expressed concern over both the advertisements of the meetings and the selection of the sites. The court
noted that the public meetings were insufficiently advertised because the one local newspaper chosen to advertise the meetings
had a relatively small circulation. The court also expressed concern
over the sites which were eventually selected. The selected sites
were the same in-state sites which were already the "primary disposal sites for the county's waste."1 3 8 Additionally, the court noted
designation process favored in-county parties, then the ordinance "has the effect of
discriminating against interstate commerce" and would be "subject to the strict
scrutiny test enunciated in Taylor and Philadelphia." Id. The court noted that,
based on provisions of the plan, Chester County appeared to favor in-county interests. See id. The court also found that the county's economic interest in selecting
the designated sites and the legislative history suggested the absence of a "level
playing field." Id. For a discussion of the potential economic motives that Chester
County had in designating the waste sites, see infra notes 143-48 and accompanying
text.
134. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 805.
135. See id.
136. See id. Harvey not only alleged that out-of-state parties were never considered, but, that such parties were not permitted to submit bids for the designation contract. See id. The court stated that if these allegations were accurate, they
would "establish that out-of-state sites did not compete on a 'level playing field'
and that the process had the effect of discriminating against interstate commerce."
Id.
137. See id. Although the Third Circuit found that consideration of the outof-state sites seemed to disprove the allegations made by Harvey, the court did not
go so far as to hold that a level playing field for out-of-state parties had been established. See id. at 805 n.15. Instead, the court stated that "[i]t is not clear whether
the Committee actually considered designating . . . [the out-of-state] sites or
whether it was simply investigating an alternative method of waste disposal. If the
Committee never considered designating those sites, that would increase the impression that the process favored the in-state facilities." Id.
138. Id. at 805-06. In addition to the 13 poorly publicized Committee meetings, two additional public hearings were held to discuss the draft plan. See id.
The court stated, however, that there was no evidence tending to show "that those
meetings were any better publicized." Id. at 806.
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that "[t] he Pottstown facility was designated as an alternate location
1 39
only after the process was concluded."
Thereafter, the court looked at whether the ordinance provided for an amendment process which would allow additional
sites.1 40 The court concluded that, although such a process did exist, it was "quite constrained."1 41 The court further noted that, even
if an amendment process were available, the plan implied that the
county did not intend to allow any alterations to the existing plan
142
through the designation of additional sites.
Finally, the court examined the county's financial interests in
designating the chosen sites. 143 The circuit court suspected that
Regardless of the inadequacy of the publicity surrounding the meetings, the
court stated that on remand, the county could rebut the impression that they did
not adequately publicize the meetings by establishing that the relevant parties were
privy to the meeting information. See id. at 806 n.16. The court noted that demonstrating that the relevant parties were aware of the information could be established through a showing that "word of such proposals travels quickly through the
trade grapevine" or that the publication was a "specialized trade journal." Id.
139. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 806. In light of these factors, the court concluded
that:
Two factors in particular create the impression that parochialism rather
than competition determined the outcome of the designation process:
(1) that established local businesses won the designation; and (2) that the
Pottstown site was designated as an alternative after the process had concluded - a status that appears to have been specially created for this
situation.
Id.
140. See id.
141. Id. The court stated, "additional sites can only be designated if the existing facilities have insufficient capacity, are unable to obtain expansion permits,
develop unforeseen environmental problems which preclude continued use of
those facilities, or are subject to regulatory changes which affect their capacity or
preclude their continued use." Id. The court found that the possibility of amendment under this process did not equalize the unavailability of opportunities for
out-of-state businesses. See id.
142. See id. The Committee indicated that it had no intention of an amendment to allow for additional facilities. See id. In a letter to DER, one Committee
member openly expressed that the county did not want to designate additional
facilities. See id. Additionally, the county had "covenanted" not to "build or operate" any additional facilities in a bond indenture that it had entered into in 1990.
Id.
143. See id. In a footnote regarding how financial interests may have influenced the Chester County designation process, the court wrote:
Although the county's pre-existing economic interest in the designated
landfill creates the incentive for the county to favor these in-state sites in
violation of the [D]ormant [C]ommerce [C]lause, not every case where
the county has an economic stake in the designated site will result in such
a violation. The county could, for example, have selected the designated
sites in an open, fair and competitive process, and then made investments
in improving those sites. The length of the period of the designation
would, of course, have to be related to the amount of the investment.
Id. at 805 n.14.
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the flow control ordinance was motivated by a need to compensate
for the significant investment the county made in the Lanchester
Landfill. 14 4 The court also noted that the county's guarantee not to
build or operate additional facilities was further proof that the financial motivations of the county may have been an important fac145
tor for favoring the in-state sites.
In light of these factors, the court stated that "[t]he need to
protect the county's financial interests thus appears to have played
a role in the county's decision to adopt flow control. 1 46 The court
compared this financial motivation to that of Clarkstown in Carbone,14 7 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a flow control ordi148
nance on similar grounds.
In conclusion, the Third Circuit stated that, although there was
some evidence of an open and fair process, "it appear[ed] that
Chester County's designation process did not afford other sites, including out-of-state sites, a level playing field." 149 The court ultimately determined that the flow control ordinance may have been
discriminatory and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration.1

50

144. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 806. The court indicated that the economic motive
was of no less importance simply because the debt associated with the Lanchester
facility was incurred before the adoption of the flow control ordinance. See id.
The court was aware that the County bought the Lanchester facility with $42.55
million in bonds, guaranteed an additional $41.5 million in county debt and
agreed to provide an additional $9.5 million to finance additional landfill projects.
See id.

The effectiveness of paying down county debt by designating the facilities as
those to be patronized also suggested to the court that economic concerns were a
motivating factor. See id. For example, the designation of the sites in the ordinances provided the county with the opportunity "to charge 200% to 300% of the
prevailing tipping fees at alternative sites." Id. at 806. The SEECRA site charged
$52.00 per ton, Lanchester charged $57.00 per ton, while an alternative landfill in
Baltimore only charged $34.00 per ton. See id. at 806-07.
145. See id. at 807.
146. Id.
147. See id. For a discussion of the financial motivations of Clarkstown in Carbone, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
148. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 807. The court analogized that "[i]n this respect,
the case closely resembles Carbone, where the Supreme Court found discriminatory
Clarkstown's 'avowed purpose .. . [of] retain[ing] the processing fees charged at
the transfer station to amortize the costs of the facility.'" Id.
149. Id. at 807.
150. See id. Although the Third Circuit concluded that the Chester ordinance
appeared to impose discriminatory effects on interstate commerce, the court did
not hold the Chester ordinance unconstitutional. See id. Instead, the court remanded the case knowing that the district court did not have the benefit of the
Third Circuit's holding in Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders, when it first considered the ordinance's constitutionality. See id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

37

VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw
Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,
Vol.JouRNAL
9, Iss. 1 [1998], Art.[Vol.
6

262
2.

IX: p. 225

The Mercer County Case

Similar to its reasoning in regard to the Chester ordinance, the
Third Circuit concluded that the district court's rationale in the
Mercer case was at odds with the standards of the Commerce Clause
when it determined that the plan was discriminatory. 151 The Third
Circuit found that the district court should have focused on the
process of selecting the in-state site to verify it was open, fair and
nondiscriminatory; the duration of the designation; and the ability
to amend the ordinance to add additional sites. 15 2 In light of these
factors, the Third Circuit also remanded the Mercer case to the district court with directions to apply the appropriate legal
standards.153

The Third Circuit, similar to the analysis applied in the Chester
County case, considered the Pennsylvania Act, designation process,
potential for discriminatory effect, amendment process and any evidence of economic favoritism that might suggest or refute a Commerce Clause violation. 154 The designation of a single in-state site,
unlike the Chester County plan, seemed to mitigate any arguments
of a Commerce Clause violation. 155 Although it did not declare the
ordinance constitutional, the court stated it was not convinced that
15 6
the Mercer ordinance was discriminatory.
According to the Third Circuit, "Mercer County made a significant attempt to open its designation process to out-of-state sites" by
soliciting bids from facilities nationwide.1 57 Although the court
151. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 807. The Third Circuit stated that the district
court's decision could be affirmed, despite the erroneous legal standard, if it was
convinced that the process of designating the in-state facility was discriminatory.
See id. The court determined, however, that the record did not show that the
designation was discriminatory. See id. Therefore, the court concluded that it
could not affirm the district court's invalidation of the Mercer Plan. See id. at 809.
152. See id. at 807. The court held that the district court's examination, which
excluded an investigation into the designation process, was at odds with its conclusion that such processes are important in determining discriminatory effect. See id.
153. See id. at 809.
154. See id. at 808-09. The court considered the impact of the Pennsylvania
Act in the same manner as it had in the Chester County case. See id. at 807-08. The
court did not provide an additional discussion of the Act other than stating that it
had been previously considered and that a similar discussion would be unnecessarily duplicative. See id. at 808.
155. See id. at 807. "[T]hat only one in-state site has been selected under the
county's designation process provides less evidence that the process has a discriminatory effect-that is, that the process tends to select in-state sites-than if a greater
number of in-state sites had been selected in the designation process." Id.
156. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 807.
157. See id. at 808. The Third Circuit highlighted the appearance of fairness
and openness of the Mercer ordinance by juxtaposing it against both the Chester
ordinance and the facially discriminatory act invalidated in Atlantic Coast Demolition
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largely accepted the district court's determination that the designation process was fair on its face and in its intent, it did suggest
doubt over whether a discriminatory effect existed. 158 For example,
the court noted that only four of the twenty-three facilities which
received application materials eventually submitted proposal packages to the county.15 9 Despite the high attrition rate of out-of-state
applicants who requested proposal materials, the Third Circuit concluded that the process seemed to be "fair, open and
' 160

competitive."

The court believed that, unlike the facts in the Chester County
case, Mercer's relative lack of economic interest suggested a nondiscriminatory motive.16 1 The only economic benefit that Mercer was
receiving as a result of the designation, was a $1.00 surcharge for
each ton of waste. 162 The court agreed with the district court's finding that this nominal financial gain seemed to suggest little motivation for economic protectionism on behalf of the county. 163
Although the court discussed the potential for amending the
ordinance to include additional facilities, the topic was discussed
only summarily.'6 The court concluded that the designation of
one facility was a permissible monopoly because Mercer County was
unlikely to have a need for an additional facility due to the lack of
waste volume. 165 Consequently, the lengthy ten year contract was

& Recycling v. Board of Chosen Freeholders. See id. The court stated that "[u] nlike
Atlantic Coast, where the scheme had the explicit goal of securing in-state disposal
capacity, Mercer County officials testified that no preference was given to in-state
or out-of-state facilities. And unlike Chester County, Mercer County prepared detailed bid specifications and advertised . .. nationwide." Id.
158. See id.
159. See id. The district court recognized that the evidence suggested that the

selection process was "fair, open and competitive" and that the failure of out-ofstate facilities to be selected was a result of their failure to submit bids. Id. Regardless of the appearance of fairness, the court suggested that Tri-County Industries,
Inc., the hauler, "may be able to identify specifications of the bid or decisional
criteria with a discriminatory effect" which may have been the reason that out-ofstate parties did not submit proposals. Id.

160. Id.
161. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 808.

162. See id.
163. See id. The court recognized that this factor alone would not save the

ordinance from invalidation. See id. However, it realized that this was another
factor to refute the contention that there was an uneven playing field. See id.

164.
165.
ties were
advisable

See id. at 809.
See id. Aside from Mercer County's determination that additional facilinot necessary due to the lack of waste volume, the district court held it
and "most efficient" for the county to utilize just one facility. Id.
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permissible and not considered evidence of a discriminatory
166
motive.
Finally, the Third Circuit determined whether Mercer County
engaged in economic favoritism since the ordinance provided for16a7
tipping fee which exceeded market rates for similar services.
The court declared that even if the fee were for the duration of the
contract, it would not suggest economic favoritism unless the rate
was unreasonable at the time the contract was created.1 68 The
court concluded that Mercer County had agreed to the high fee,
not in an attempt to confer an economic windfall on the facility,
but rather, because it feared that the fees would continue to
escalate.1 6 9

B. Judge Nygaard's Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Nygaard opined that the majority erroneously focused on the fairness of the designation process.1 70 He reasoned that concentrating on the process ignored the fact that
171
" [d]iscriminatory purpose or effect triggers heightened scrutiny."
Judge Nygaard concluded that the county flow control ordinances
had the effect of discriminating against interstate commerce and
were thus subject to the heightened scrutiny test. 172 He deter166. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 809. Although the court recognized that the ten
year contract could be considered a monopoly for the designation period, it suggested that an easier case would be presented if the monopoly did not preclude
the losing contractors from participation in the Mercer market for so long. See id.
at 809 n.19.
167. See id. at 809. Based on the evidence, the court concluded that it was
unclear whether tipping fees, like the service contract, were locked in for the same
ten year term. See id.
168. See id. The court highlighted this point by stating "[a]lthough the
County appears to have made a 'bad bet' on the price of long term waste disposal,
the market could just as easily have moved in the opposite direction and made
county officials look financially savvy." Id. The court went on to compare the Mercer ordinance with the Chester ordinance, noting the differences between the contract fee and the market rate at the time were much greater in the Chester case. See
id.
169. See id. at 809 n.21.
170. See id. at 809-11 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
171. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 810. Judge Nygaard stated that the designation
process was irrelevant because "[t]he outcome of a selection process, however
open that process may be, can be discriminatory in its practical effect." Id. He
continued to state that "[als in the Carbone case, 'the real question is whether the
flow control ordinance is valid despite its undoubted effect on interstate commerce.'" Id. In an accompanying footnote, Judge Nygaard wrote, "[siignificantly,
the Carbone court did not engage in an analysis of the process by which the Clarkstown facility was selected. It looked only to the effect." Id. at 810 n.1.
172. For a discussion of the two tests that courts apply to alleged Commerce
Clause violations, see supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
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mined that the Mercer holding should be affirmed and the Chester
173
holding should be reversed and remanded.
Judge Nygaard argued that both the Chester and Mercer ordinances should be invalidated. As support for his position, he
pointed out that Carboneholds unconstitutional all flow control ordinances that are coupled with a designation. 174 He then applied
the discriminatory test after concluding that the Chester and Mercer ordinances were flow control measures with a designation, and
therefore, were discriminatory. 175 Judge Nygaard ultimately found
both ordinances unconstitutional, reasoning that, although legitimate local purposes existed for the acts, nondiscriminatory alterna176
tives were available to both counties.
V.

CRrrIcAL ANALysIS

In Harvey, the Third Circuit analyzed whether the Chester or
Mercer County ordinances violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause. The Third Circuit remanded both cases to their respective
district court to examine whether the counties' waste disposal facility designation processes were fair and open to out-of-state parties.1 7 7 In evaluating the Third Circuit's opinion, there appears to
173. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 810.
174. See id. Judge Nygaard's adoption of a broad interpretation of Carbone is
evident from a reading of his opinion in Harvey. In his dissent he wrote, "[iln
Carbone the Supreme Court held that a flow control ordinance coupled with a
designation discriminated in its effect because it allowed only the designated operator to provide waste services within the geographical limits of the municipality."
Id. The Pike balancing test would therefore be inappropriate because it is only
used when evaluating ordinances imposing burdens on interstate commerce that
are nondiscriminatory. See id.
For a discussion of other courts adopting this broad interpretation of Carbone,
see supra notes 75 & 77-80 and accompanying text.
175. See id. at 810-11. Judge Nygaard concluded that the ordinances under
review fit into the class of ordinances invalidated under Carbone, namely, ordinances with a designation, because both ordinances "mandate[ ] that waste be delivered only to a designated facility." Id. at 810.
176. See id. at 811. Judge Nygaard stated:
For example, the county might seek assurances of ten years capacity from
a few disposal facilities without then requiring all county-generated waste
actually to be disposed of at those same specific facilities. The goal of
providing ten years of disposal capacity need not require that each facility, to accept waste, must provide an assurance of ten years of capacity.
Like the municipality in Carbone,the county in each of the cases before us
has open to it "any number of nondiscriminatory alternatives for addressing the .

.

. problems alleged to justify the ordinance in question."

Id. (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393). For a discussion of alternative nondiscriminatory purposes which have been suggested by other courts and commentators,
see infra notes 191-238 and accompanying text.
177. See id. at 809.
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be sufficient evidence to decide the issue without remand since, regardless of the importance attached to the designation process, the
ordinances would survive challenge under either of the tests used
178
to evaluate Commerce Clause validity.
A.

Designation Process is Non-Essential in Determining the
Validity of a Flow Control Ordinance

The Third Circuit possessed sufficient evidence to render a final decision in Harvey. The Supreme Court, circuit courts and district courts have consistently decided cases questioning the
constitutional validity of flow control ordinances under the Dormant Commerce Clause without requiring information regarding
the designation process. 179 Given this history, the attributes of the
designation process are not integral in a Commerce Clause analysis.
Therefore, the Third Circuit unnecessarily focused on the designation process, while it could have resolved the Commerce Clause issues in Harvey.

B.

The Chester and Mercer Ordinances Are Valid Under the
Strict Scrutiny Analysis Applied to Acts Which
Discriminate in Purpose or Effect

Presuming the challenging parties could prove the ordinances
were in fact discriminatory, thus invoking strict scrutiny, the counties would be able to meet their burden by proving that the ordinances served legitimate purposes and that those purposes could
not have been served as well by available non-discriminatory
means.1 8 0 Therefore, if the counties could survive strict scrutiny,
178. Presuming the court found that Harvey and Tri-County had proven the
ordinances discriminated in purpose or effect, additional evidence regarding the
designation process would be irrelevant. Regardless of whether additional evidence suggested the designation process was discriminatory, this evidence would
not change the burden on the counties if the ordinances were already subject to
strict scrutiny. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392-93 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131

(1986)).
179. See generally Carbone, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of
Martin, Minn., 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993); Waste Management v. Ingham
County, 941 F. Supp. 656 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Stephen D. DeVitoJr. Trucking, Inc.
v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I. 1991).
Judge Nygaard also adopted this belief in his dissent in Harvey. See 68 F.3d at 80911. For a discussion of his rejection of concentrating on the designation process,
see supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.

180. In Harvey, the majority wrote that if the defendant can establish that
there is a "legitimate local purpose" and that the interest could not be served "as
well" by "available nondiscriminatory" alternatives, the defendant will prevail and
the act will be constitutional despite its discriminatory effects. Harvey, 68 F.3d at
797 (citations omitted).
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their ordinances would be constitutional, regardless of additional
fact finding regarding the designation process.
Under the discriminatory purpose or effect test, the challenging party has the burden of proving that the act in dispute discriminates against interstate commerce. 18 1 After this is established, the
governmental entity which promulgated the act can only prevail
where it demonstrates that the act serves a legitimate local purpose,
and that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.' 8 2 Both the Chester and Mercer County ordinances meet these burdens.
1.

Legitimate Local Purpose

The Supreme Court, other federal courts, both houses of Congress, state legislatures, county governing bodies and EPA recognize
long term planning for municipal waste as a legitimate local concern.1 83 Flow controlling waste isjust one method by which municipalities attempt to achieve this goal. The primary purpose of longterm waste management planning through flow control ordinances
l8 4
is to preserve the citizen's health, safety and general welfare.
Even courts which have held flow control ordinances to be a violation of the Commerce Clause have commented that the goals of the
For a discussion of the tests and burdens accorded each party in a suit alleging
violations of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the burden on the challenging party, see supra note
31 and accompanying text.
182. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). For a discussion of how a
state or political subdivision can rebut a showing of discrimination, see supranotes
32-33 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (stating unless
Congress has stated to the contrary, acts taken to conserve vital resources will not
be considered to be unreasonable); Waste Management v. Ingham County, 941 F.
Supp. 656, 668 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (stating long term planning for solid waste management to protect public health and safety and environment is legitimate local
purpose); Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814 F.
Supp. 1566, 1581 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (stating interest in pursuing a comprehensive
long term plan for management of solid waste is legitimate local purpose).
EPA, in its amicus brief in Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, stated that "flow
control laws mandating local waste disposal to ensure the economic viability of

designated local waste facilities are in accord with national environmental and energy policy." Roddewig & Sechen, supra note 9, at 804.
184. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 792 (stating "[s]ecuring long term access to disposal facilities necessary to protect the citizens' health and safety 'requires long term
commitments, debt and security'") (quoting Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9,
at 373 n.66); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 4000.102(a) (20) (West Supp.
1997) (stating purpose of act is to authorize, among other things, municipalities to
flow control waste since " [a] 11aspects of solid waste management, particularly the
disposition of solid waste, pose a critical threat to the health, safety and welfare of
the citizens of this Commonwealth").
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ordinances were legitimate. 185 Given the wide recognition of long
term waste planning and flow control ordinances Chester and Mercer Counties would have little difficulty satisfying the legitimate local purpose element of the test.
Another legitimate local purpose of flow controlling waste is to
ensure adequate funding for expensive waste facilities, which municipalities are becoming increasingly required to maintain. 186 Financing waste facilities is not a distinct goal in and of itself; rather,
it is viewed as a means of ensuring that the larger goals of health,
safety and welfare is realized through the provision of adequate
waste facilities. 187 Since courts are willing to recognize the legitimate purpose of protecting health and the environment, it follows
that these courts would also recognize the means necessary to
achieve these purposes as legitimate. 18 8
2.

The Purpose Could Not Be Served "As Well" by Available NonDiscriminatoryMeans

Chester and Mercer Counties can also meet their burdens
under the second part of the discrimination test. This prong requires the challenged party, to demonstrate that the available alternatives were non-discriminatory and could not serve the purposes
of the ordinances as well as the flow control measures under review. 18 9 Chester and Mercer Counties can establish that the suggested alternatives are either unavailable, discriminatory, or would
185. For example, Judge Nygaard, who believed that the flow control ordinances of both Chester and Mercer Counties should have been found unconstitutional, stated that the counties' ordinances have "laudable goals." Harvey, 68 F.3d
at 811.
186. Making sure that municipal bonds are adequately backed with revenue is
necessary to give the bonds attractive ratings needed to entice investors. For a
discussion of the negative effects that improper revenue assurances have on bond
ratings, see supra note 7, infra note 241 and accompanying text.
Without positive ratings, cautious investors will place their money in alternative investments with greater security. SeeWiLLiAM A. KLEIN &JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 233 (6th ed. 1996) (stating "[a] critical axiom of modern investment analysis is that in their . . . investment decisions the

overwhelming majority of people are risk averse"). For a discussion of the great
expense associated with the construction and maintenance of modern waste facilities, see supra notes 7 & 13 and accompanying text.
187. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 792 (citing Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at
373).
188. This is not to suggest that financing measures alone are legitimate purposes which would enable a municipality to discriminate against interstate commerce, for this has been expressly precluded by the Supreme Court. See Carbone,
511 U.S. at 393 (stating "[b]y itself, of course, revenue generation is not a local
interest that can justify discrimination against interstate commerce").
189. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 797 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137).
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not serve the legitimate purposes as well as the ordinances they
adopted. A showing of any one of these factors would satisfy the
counties' burdens under the strict scrutiny test and result in the
validity of the flow control ordinances. 190
Suggested alternatives to the legal flow control employed by
the counties in the present case are increased taxes or issuance of
general revenue bonds, economic flow control, flow control by municipal haulage, contract flow control, franchise flow control, and
uniform safety regulations.
a. Increased Taxes/Issuance of General Revenue Bonds
The Carbone Court suggested that flow controlling waste was
not the only means to ensure long-term survival of waste disposal
facilities. 19 1 Instead, the Court reasoned that municipalities could
achieve similar purposes through the issuance of general revenue
bonds 192 or by raising taxes. 193 Although these options are both
non-discriminatory and available, these alternatives would not serve
Chester and Mercer Counties' legitimate purposes as well as the
flow control ordinances under review in Harvey.
Unlike flow control plans which finance a facility with revenue
raised from minimum tonnage guarantees, a plan utilizing taxes or
bonding simply finances the facility by raising taxes or selling
bonds. 9 4 Absent from these alternatives is the guaranteed mini190. The analysis of the Third Circuit indicates that Chester and Mercer
Counties could satisfy their burdens under the discrimination test by demonstrating that the legitimate local purpose could not be served (1) as well by; (2) available; and (3) nondiscriminatory means. See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 797. The inclusion
of these three elements in the test indicates that if a party can demonstrate that
any one element cannot be met through the adoption of an alternative, the discriminatory ordinance survives strict scrutiny. See Maine, 477 U.S. at 142-52 (1st
Cir. 1986) (applying these elements to Maine baitfish law and finding law
constitutional).
191. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394.
192. Id. General obligation bonds are defined as "bond[s] secured by the
'full faith and credit' of the issuing government and backed by revenues from its
taxing power." BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 179 (6th ed. 1990).
193. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, Carbone, 511 U.S. 383,
394 (1994) (citing New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
194. A municipality could also choose a hybrid of the two options. For example, if a municipality chooses to issue general obligation bonds to finance a waste
facility, the debt generated from those bonds, by definition, are paid for through
the taxing power of the municipality. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at
370-71, 404-07 & n.54. Therefore, because of the nature of these bonds, if a municipality chooses to issue them to finance a facility, it necessarily raises taxes to pay
for the facility. Thus, a hybrid plan invoking both the taxing and bonding alternatives is created. See generally Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 369-73 (explaining the different issues in financing waste management).
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mum tonnage found in flow control ordinances. This guarantee of
a predictable amount of waste encourages recycling. 195 Without
such guarantees, waste service providers cannot rely on sufficient
amounts of recoverable waste to warrant the large expense of constructing and maintaining recycling facilities. 19 6 Therefore, plans
to finance waste facilities through raising taxes or issuing bonds do
not guarantee minimum amounts of waste and will not encourage
waste recovery and recycling. As such, flow controlling waste
achieves a higher level of environmental and health protection
than simply raising taxes or issuing bonds. As a result, although
available and nondiscriminatory, these options do not qualify as alternatives which serve legitimate local purposes as well as flow
control.
b. Economic Flow Control
Chester and Mercer Counties can meet their burden under the
discrimination test by establishing that economic flow control does
not serve legitimate local purposes as well as legal flow control. Further, the constitutionality of economic flow control is questionable,
and thus, may not qualify as a nondiscriminatory alternative.
Economic flow control, which is the type of flow control utilized by Chester and Mercer Counties and at issue in Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, creates hidden expenses. 197 Specifically,
"[t] he need to subsidize tipping fees ... merely add[s] transaction
costs to local government efforts aimed at improving the reliability
and quality of solid waste management." 198 Thus, even assuming
195. For a discussion of how flow controlling waste encourages recycling efforts, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of how flow control guarantees sufficient amounts of
recyclable waste, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
197. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 404-07.
198. See Municipal Solid Waste Flow Control, 1993: Hearing on H.R 1357 and
H.R 2649 Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materialsof the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 103d. Cong. 235 (1993) (joint statement of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and Municipal Waste Management Association). The statement, in
pertinent part noted that "[s]ubsidies to lower tipping fees are simply alternative
means of ensuring that local interests bear the costs of financing solid waste facilities. Legal flow control better reflects the overall social costs of solid waste management and helps to allocate the responsibility to individual waste generators."
Id. Therefore, in addition to not serving the objectives of legal flow control (the
type of flow control employed by Chester and Mercer Counties) as well as being
more expensive, economic flow control does not serve the purposes of waste planning as well because it does not spread the costs evenly. See id. at 236. As a result,
economic flow control would have the result of causing local parties to incur disproportionate costs from the disposal of non-local waste. See id. This demonstrated inequity shows that economic flow control does not serve legitimate
purposes as well for at least two reasons.
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that economic flow control can achieve the same results as legal
flow control, it does so at a greater expense.1 99 Therefore, economic flow control does not serve the legitimate purpose of effec20 0
tive waste management as well as legal flow control.
Even if economic flow control could serve Chester and Mercer
Counties' purposes as well as the ordinances at issue, there is some
doubt regarding its constitutional validity. 20 1 At least one district
199. See id. at 234-36. Based on economic realities, increased transaction costs
would force municipalities and counties to pay more for proper waste disposal
under economic flow control than under the legal flow control mechanisms
adopted by Chester and Mercer Counties. See id. at 231-36.
200. The below market tipping fees that are characteristic of economic flow
control would guarantee that the facility would be patronized. See id. at 227-28.
Because municipalities cannot impose waste import restriction bans to limit out-ofstate parties from taking advantage of the reduced fees, facilities are ai the mercy
of every outside hauler in the country who was looking to reduce their expenses by
patronizing the artificial market. See id. at 233-34. As a result, landfills which have
these fee structures would reach capacity sooner than higher priced facilities,
which forces municipalities back into the waste disposal crisis. See id. at 229-32.
Economic flow control also has political and public policy problems which are
not characteristic of legal flow control. See id. at 233-36; see also Petersen &
Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 404-07. A municipality may issue revenue bonds to
finance a project if those bonds are backed by a revenue stream like that provided
in legal flow control. See id. at 234. Without the revenue stream guaranteed by
legal flow control, municipalities would be forced to issue general obligation
bonds. See id. at 235. General obligation bonds depend on taxes, special assessments or mandatory user fees for repayment. See id. General obligation bonds are
frequently issued to pay for schools and other essential infrastructure which do not
provide a steady stream of revenue. See id. at 231. Because of state limitations on
municipal debt, general obligation bonds are not unlimited and should be reserved for municipal functions including schools and police departments. See id. at
231, 234. Moreover, since most waste authorities lack the power to issue general
obligation bonds, revenue bonds are the only option, and one which can only be
pursued with the steady revenue stream that flow control ordinances provide. See
id. at 234-35. In light of the fact that these financing drawbacks are not present
with legal flow control, economic flow control cannot serve the same purpose of
responsible waste management as well as legal flow control. See id. at 233.
201. Economic flow control can be criticized on the same grounds as legal
flow control, because it is also exclusive. See Waste Flow Control Hearing,supra note
9, at 233. Economic flow control limits both the opportunities to haul waste and
where that waste can be hauled. See id. Because of this exclusivity, economic flow
control stands on dubious constitutional ground, and is therefore, not a nondiscriminatory alternative. But see Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 406-07
(explaining while economic flow control appears constitutionally valid, court in
Mid-American Waste Systems, Inc. v. Fisher noted economic flow control "could be
considered to violate the Commerce Clause"). If Judge Nygaard's interpretation
of Carbonein his Harvey dissent is accurate, any flow control measure coupled with
a designation is discriminatory. As such, economic flow control does not qualify as
a nondiscriminatory alternative to legal flow control. The same result would occur
under many other courts' analyses, which have interpreted Carbonewith the same
breadth as Judge Nygaard. There is significant doubt as to the validity of any flow
control ordinance which is coupled with a designation.
For a discussion ofJudge Nygaard's interpretation of the Carbone decision, see
supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. For a discussion of other courts which
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court has held that the imposition of fees on waste generators could
be a violation of the Commerce Clause. 2 02 Importantly, the Harvey
court had the benefit of the Carbonedecision as a guide in making
such a determination. 20 3 Thus, there is cause for questioning
whether economic flow control would indeed be a non-discriminatory alternative.
c. Flow Control By Municipal Haulage
Flow control by municipal haulage requires local governments
to privatize the waste collection and transportation industries. 20 4 As
a result, local governments are forced to hire additional personnel
and to purchase new vehicles and equipment to collect waste. 20 5
Perhaps the largest drawback of this alternative is the expense associated with purchasing new equipment and hiring additional employees to provide these services.2 0 6 The immediate result of such
a plan would require the incurrence of greater debt than the coun20 7
ties have already assumed.
Additionally, because a municipal haulage plan requires the
operation of trucks and other equipment, transportation of waste,
and maintenance of larger work forces, the county exposes itself to
have adopted a broad reading of Carbone,see supranotes 75 & 77-80 and accompanying text.
202. See Mid-American Waste Sys., Inc. v. Fisher, No. C-2-94-493, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20966 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 1994).
203. The Supreme Court issued its decision in Carbone on May 16, 1994. See
Carbone, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). The U.S. Court for the Southern District of Ohio
decided Mid-American fifteen days later on May 31, 1994. See Mid-American, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20966, at *1.
204. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 396. Although this alternative is described as the least likely to be held unconstitutional, under the broad
reading of Carbone, courts may invalidate such a plan if the privatization of the
market resulted in excluding certain participants. See id. Unfortunately for
Chester and Mercer County, they would have to exclude all or a substantial part of
private hauling to meet their goals of ensuring a certain minimum tonnage. See
generally Harvey, 68 F.3d at 794-96 (explaining concerns surrounding choices made
by counties in choosing waste disposal sites). Thus, although flow control by municipal haulage could survive constitutional scrutiny where exclusivity is not dominant, such exclusivity would likely be necessary to serve the goals of Chester and
Mercer County. See id. Therefore, municipal haulage may not qualify as a nondiscriminatory alternative.
205. See Peterson & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 397.
206. See id. If Chester and Mercer Counties would have pursued this option
to ensure that the designated facilities received the appropriate amounts of waste,
they would have had to purchase new trucks and other equipment in volumes
large enough to service the waste collection, transportation and processing needs
of an entire county. See id.
207. See id. Because adoption of such a plan requires such a "great commitment of resources," the majority of governments have declined to adopt it. See id.
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liability which is not characteristic of legal flow control. 20 8 Similarly, a large part of municipal motivation for adopting flow control
ordinances to finance waste disposal sites is to ensure that waste is
disposed of in an environmentally responsible fashion, thus comply20 9 Compliing with federal and state environmental regulations.
ance with these regulations is not assured where the county's
involvement is limited to just the haulage of waste. Waste processing facility compliance simply cannot be assured by the counties
where they have no involvement in the operation and oversight of
2 10
the landfill.
Further, government motivation for flow controlling waste is to
fill the waste processing facility shortage that has resulted since the
1970's and 80's.211 Increasing the dependence on private facilities
through measures like flow control by municipal haulage only exacerbates this crisis, ultimately leading to greater environmental
2 12
degradation.
208. See id. (stating active roles required of governments adopting municipal
haulage plans results in "increase in potential liability"). Such active participation
of the county is not required under legal flow control, since under that type of
plan, the municipality need not be involved in operating a fleet of disposal trucks
and hiring additional employees to operate that machinery.
209. See Waste Flow Control Hearing, supra note 9, at 19 (statement of Bruce
Weddle, Director, Municipal and Industrial Solid Waste Division, EPA). Mr. Weddle stated:
Concern was raised by the private sector over the potential liability forced
on them in the event that a facility was forced to use a certain site and
that site later became subject to cleanup under Superfund. In essence,
what they are saying is that they would sign a contract requiring them to
use an individual facility, they would have no choice in that facility. That
facility may not be a facility operated in compliance with all rules and
regulations and that would subject the company to Superfund liability
later.
Local governments, at least some local governments, look to the very
same situation and saw flow control as a way for them to designate a facility and thereby reduce the likelihood that they would be involved in
Superfund liability down the road, because they could assure that facility
was operated in compliance with all the rules and regulations.
Id.
210. See id.
211. For a discussion of the need for public bodies to fill the waste disposal
facility crisis after large scale closures of private facilities, see supra notes 9-12 and
accompanying text.
212. This is the necessary result because, unlike legal flow control, a municipal haulage plan does not encourage the construction of publicly owned facilities
since the municipality need only involve itself in the haulage end of the business.
Without the construction of new facilities in response to facility closures which
have characterized the waste disposal crisis, disposal capacity will continue to
shrink as demand for waste disposal facilities increases. See generally Wolf, Solid
Waste Crisis, supra note 4, at 529-39 (commenting on trend away from using only
landfills and toward creating waste management systems to deal with solid waste).
For a discussion of the waste disposal crisis and the increasing amount of waste that

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

49

274

VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw
IX: p. 225
Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,
Vol. JouRNAL
9, Iss. 1 [1998], Art.[Vol.
6

Therefore, municipal haulage does not serve the same purposes as legal flow control because it places heavier financial and
liability burdens on government and aggravates the waste facility
shortage crisis. As a result, flow control by municipal haulage exaggerates the negative environmental effects of delaying effective
waste management, and accordingly does not serve the legitimate
2 13
purposes of waste management as well as legal flow control.
Finally, although this alternative is described as the least likely
to be held unconstitutional, under the broad reading of Carbone,
courts may invalidate such a plan if the privatization of the market
results in the exclusion of private participants. 2 14 Unfortunately,
Chester and Mercer Counties would have to exclude all or a substantial part of the private hauling industry to meet their goals of
ensuring an established minimum tonnage. Consequently,
although flow control by municipal haulage could survive constitutional scrutiny where exclusivity does not dominate the plan, such
exclusivity would likely be necessary to serve the goals of Chester
and Mercer Counties. Therefore, as required by their disposal
needs, municipal haulage may not qualify as a nondiscriminatory
alternative.
d. Franchise and Contract Flow Control
Because franchise and contract flow control are characterized
by increased costs and more onerous restrictions on the waste hauling industry, this option cannot serve the purposes of responsible
is being produced throughout the country, see supra notes 3-20 and accompanying
text.
213. Flow control by municipal haulage also has unconstitutional effects
which, although not part of the legal calculus, should be considered for public
policy reasons. Because flow control by municipal haulage requires the monopolization of the haulage industry by the adopting county, such a plan can be harsh on
private business which previously provided collection and haulage services. See generally Interstate Transportation,supra note 4, at 11-12 (statement of Christine Todd
Whitman, Governor, State of New Jersey) (explaining while local and state governments have key roles in waste management, "we need to find a balance, a balance
between protecting the market place and preserving waste management systems
designed to meet many goals including reasonable cost"). These impacts would
particularly effect small local businesses. For a discussion of the manner in which
flow control benefits small business, see Impact of Solid Waste, supra note 19, at 23032 (letter from local government coalition for Environmentally Sound Municipal
Solid Waste Management to Rep. Myers).
214. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 396-97 ("The only argument
that could potentially succeed, however, is a Carbone-based contention that,
should the municipality attempt to exclude all competition from private haulers, it
would be impermissibly regulating interstate commerce.").
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waste management as well as legal flow control. 2 15 Further,
franchise and contract flow control, like other alternatives, are of
dubious constitutional validity and may not qualify as a nondiscrimi216
natory alternative.
Contract flow control requires municipalities to first monopolize the waste haulage market.2 17 Municipalities can then contract
with private service providers to haul waste pursuant to the terms of
the county's contract. 21 8 Like legal flow control, at least in terms of
the needs of Chester and Mercer Counties, the contract could re2 19
quire a hauler to deliver waste to a designated facility.
Franchise flow control, like contract flow control, also requires
municipalities to establish a monopoly over the local waste collec215. In the case involving Chester and Mercer Counties, these schemes would
be more disruptive than legal flow control. For example, under the legal flow
control plans of Chester and Mercer Counties, any number of parties could participate in the waste hauling market while the number of landfills was limited to three
facilities and one facility, respectively. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester,
68 F.3d 788, 794-96 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining counties' reasoning supporting
their waste management plans). If Chester and Mercer Counties had monopolized the market and adopted either contract or franchise flow control, the counties would have had to confer contracts on a limited number of hauling
companies, thus limiting the total number of haulers. See Petersen & Abramowitz,
supra note 9, at 397-404 (explaining basic concepts of contract and franchise flow
control). Additionally, to achieve the legitimate purpose of financing the waste
facility, Chester and Mercer Counties would also have to impose a condition in the
franchise or contract agreement limiting the haulers to dumping waste at the designated facilities. See id. (highlighting that part of negotiated terms between private hauler and municipality include facility designation). As a result, under
franchise or contract flow plans, both the waste haulage and the waste processing
market would be conferred upon a fortunate few. See id. As a result, these alternatives may not qualify as nondiscriminatory alternatives. But see Petersen &
Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 395 ("Because the Carbonedecision on its face does
not address non-legislative forms of flow control, there remain four viable alternative methods that should withstand Commerce Clause challenges by which local
governments can ensure that waste is delivered to the desired facilities... [including] contract flow control [and] franchise flow control.").
216. For a discussion of the broad interpretation of Carbone, and the doubt
that has been cast over the constitutionality of all flow control measures, including
franchise and contract flow control, see supranotes 75 & 77-80 and accompanying
text.
217. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 397. Contract flow is described as follows:
[It] is achieved when a local government effectively monopolizes solid
waste collection and then contracts out to one or more haulers to provide
collection services on behalf of the municipality. The contract typically
includes a negotiated provision, voluntarily agreed to by the hauler, in
which the municipality designates a disposal site or reserves to itself the
ability to do so in the future.
Id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 397-98.
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tion market. 22 0 After doing so, local governments grant franchises
to selected parties. 22 ' These franchises could grant service providers property rights, like use of publicly owned facilities, as well as
the contractual rights which were granted under contract flow control schemes. 222 Under the government's contract rights, condi2 23
tions can be imposed on selected haulers.
Primarily, the validity of franchise and contract flow control as
viable alternatives is questionable in light of Carbone.22 4 Although
the court did not specifically speak to the issue, the legality of any
non-legislative flow control measure is uncertain. 225 If Judge Nygaard's and the majority of courts' view of Carbone is accepted, any
flow control ordinance coupled with a designation is discriminatory. 226 Franchise and contract flow control plans would likely con-

tain these two attributes, and thus may not qualify as a nondiscriminatory alternative.
Similarly, both alternatives have the potential to discriminate
as a result of exclusivity in awarding franchises or contracts. 22 7 To
achieve the purposes of the county or municipality, the benefits of a
franchise or contract would likely be conferred on one or a few
service providers. 22 8 The same constitutional arguments that are
220. See id. at 398404. To establish a monopoly over the local waste collec-

tion market, "[a] grant of a solid waste collection franchise is a grant by a government to authorize one or more private companies to provide solid waste collection
services on behalf of the government" for "services and functions that the government itself is obligated to furnish to its citizens." Id. at 399.
221. See id. at 400. Under this type of plan, a franchisee "receives only those
powers [which] the government [gives to it]." Id.
222. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 400.
223. See id. Because the government has the power to exclusively control the
waste disposal market, those powers that are not delegated to the haulers through
the franchise would be reserved by the municipality. See id. at 400-01. Therefore,
"[b]y reserving this power to itself when it grants a waste collection franchise, the
government, as the monopolizing entity, retains the authority to impose flow control." Id. at 400. Thus, the franchise is, in part, contractual in nature, and the
municipality can require that the hauler dump the waste at a specified site as a
condition of that contract. See id.
224. For a discussion of the broad interpretation of Carbone, which has the
effect of invalidating most or all flow control measures, see supra notes 75 & 77-80
& 174-75 and accompanying text.
225. See id.; see also Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 402.
226. For a discussion of the broad interpretation of Carbone, which has the
effect of invalidating most or all flow control measures, see supra notes 75 & 77-80
& 174-75 and accompanying text.
227. See Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 401 (stating exclusive
franchises or contracts are more likely to be challenged on constitutional grounds
than nonexclusive plans).
228. Both Chester and Mercer Counties would likely have to provide exclusive
contracts or franchises. See Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d
788, 807-08 (3d Cir. 1995). Chester County would be motivated to adopt an exclu-
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leveled against Chester and Mercer Counties in their designation of
in-state waste facilities could be made under franchise and contract
flow control where the contracts or franchises are conferred only
on in-state parties. 229 Similarly, the Supreme Court has cast great
2 30
doubt over the validity of plans which invoke such exclusivity.
The Carbone Court's citation of an earlier decision involving
franchising casts constitutional doubt on whether these alternatives
231
qualify as nondiscriminatory.
Further, these plans would require Chester and Mercer Counties to first establish a monopoly over the local waste collection market. 23 2 This requirement would require the counties to incur great

expenses over and above those already incurred. As a result,
franchise and contract flow control schemes may not qualify as an
alternative which serves the legitimate local purposes as well as the
233
ordinances under review in Harvey.
Additionally, it has been argued that under franchise and contract flow control schemes, governments may impose requirements
of "adhesion, in other words.... flow control provisions are forced
on haulers that are unable to refuse the terms." 23 4 This is a compelsive franchise or contract because exclusive agreements would be necessary to
achieve its goals of ensuring that waste was delivered only to the sites which it
wished to patronize. See id. at 806-07. Mercer County on the other hand would
likely only need one or a few service providers because of the lack of waste volume
that it needs to service. See id. at 808-09.
229. For example, the designation of in-state sites under the Chester and Mercer plans is analogous to conferring franchise rights or contract rights to in-state
parties. The result of this reality renders franchise and contract flow control, at
best, as equally discriminatory as legal flow control. Regardless of the degree of
discrimination, however, it would arguably be as discriminatory as the legal flow
control utilized by the counties, and would thus not qualify as a nondiscriminatory
alternative.
230. See Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
231. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394. The Court's earlier decision in Buck dealt
with a franchise plan which conferred the use of highways upon the franchise
holder to the exclusion of others. See id. In Buck, the Supreme Court stated the
following:
[A franchise is] not regulation with a view to safety or the conservation of
the highways, but the prohibition of competition. It determines not the
manner of use, but the persons by whom the highways may be used. It
prohibits such use to some persons while permitting it to others for the
same purpose and in the same manner.
Buck, 267 U.S. at 315-316.
232. For a definition of how franchise and contract flow control must be administered, including the requirement of first establishing a monopoly, see supra
notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
233. For a discussion of why requiring monopolization renders an alternative
non-qualified to serving legitimate local purposes as well as the Chester and Mercer Counties ordinances, see supra notes 215 & 229 and accompanying text.
234. Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at 403.
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ling argument because under these alternatives, a hauler has two
options, either to accept the contract terms as they are, or to look
for another job. Thus, these alternatives may be unavailable because they appear to lack mutuality and may be invalid under contract law.
e.

Uniform Safety Regulations

Uniform regulations are undesirable because increased regulation of the waste services industry is one of the primary reasons why
the waste crisis, and the environmental degradation associated with
it, exist today. 23 5 Increased regulations drive up operational
costs. 236 Increased costs reduce profitability and are often so sub-

stantial that facilities can no longer operate and are forced to
close. 23 7 This, in turn, causes shortages of waste service providers.

Therefore, although one would expect regulation of the waste services industry to provide environmental dividends, history has shown
that regulations often lead to the very problems for which flow control was invented. 23 8 Consequently, increased regulations not only
235. See Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 48 F.3d 701, 704-05 (3d Cir. 1995). In this opinion, the Third Circuit
stated that increased environmental regulation is a leading cause of facility closure,
shortfalls in disposal capacity, and the overall waste disposal crisis. See id. at 704; see
also Harvey, 68 F.3d at 791 (stating increased regulations caused shortages in capacity and increased disposal costs). For a further discussion of the waste disposal
crisis and the role that increased regulation has played in causing the crisis, see
supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
236. For example, compliance with RCRA, the Clean Air Act and other state

and federal regulations drive up costs for waste facilities. These costs have been
cited as an attributing cause of the waste disposal crisis. See, e.g.,
Roddewig &
Sechen, supra note 9, at 802 (stating "[a]s regulation of the landfill industry increased, costs increased as well"). Therefore, uniform regulations are not an alternative which satisfies the "as well" element of the strict scrutiny test because these
regulations will have negative environmental impacts, as they have in the past,
which are not associated with flow control. For a discussion the waste disposal
crisis and its relation with regulations such as RCRA and the Clean Air Act, see
supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
237. See id. For a discussion of the assertion that increased costs result in facility closures, see supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
238. There are additional drawbacks with increased regulations that will be
specific to existing publicly owned waste facilities like Chester County's Lanchester
site. To allocate the needed monies to conform with new uniform regulations,
governments will necessarily have to pursue options such as raising taxes, issuing
new or additional bonds, increasing tipping fees at the facility, or cutting other
governmental services. See Interstate Transportation, supra note 4, at 5-6 (statement
of Sen. Lautenberg) (explaining that flow control would result in loss of revenue,
diminishing funds available for "unprofitable waste management activities, such as
recycling and household hazardous waste programs"); see also Waste Flow Control
Hearing,supra note 9, at 229-35 (joint statement of U.S. Conference of Mayors and
Municipal Waste Management Ass'n.) (explaining financial realities of waste management and how these realities will be impacted without flow control). All of
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fail to serve legitimate local purposes as well as flow control ordinances, they cause the very problems which flow control plans are
adopted to remedy.
Finally, because all of the alternatives, except uniform regulations, are of dubious constitutional validity, they likely do not qualify as nondiscriminatory alternatives. Similarly, none of the
alternatives serve the purposes of effective and responsible waste
management as well as legal flow control. As a result, even assuming that the legal flow control ordinances of Chester and Mercer
Counties are discriminatory, they should withstand constitutional
challenge because they pass the strictest test accorded acts under
Commerce Clause review.
VI.

IMPACT

The repercussions of Harvey, are not only numerous, but are of
substantial import to all counties and municipalities in the nation.23 9 The skepticism which this court's decision has placed on
flow control regulation will impact communities legally, financially,
environmentally, and socially.
The legal ramifications of the Harvey decision will only increase
the trend of invalidating municipal efforts to remedy the problems
which have been, and continue to be, associated with waste planning and disposal. 240 This invalidation will have negative economic
these options have their drawbacks. None of these options need be pursued when
facilities are guaranteed financial self-sufficiency through legal flow control. See
Waste Flow Control Hearing,supra note 9, at 230 (explaining that "Congressional
legislation authorizing flow control is needed to avert a potential financial disaster
of enormous magnitude"); see generally Petersen & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at
365-69 (explaining implications of loss of legislation flow control on local governments). Thus, the purpose of effective waste management cannot be served as well
with uniform regulations as with legal flow control. See Waste Flow Control Hearing,
supra note 9, at 235 ("Legal flow control better reflects the overall social cost of
solid waste management and helps to allocate the responsibility to individual waste
generators."); see also Interstate Transportation,supra note 4, at 110 (explaining that
waste management plans will need to be rethought if flow control is not permitted
and "[1] acking any predictability of volume, counties and cities will not be able to
encourage or assist private entrepreneurs in establishing innovative alternatives to
landfills").
239. See Roddewig & Sechen, supra note 9, at 802. One commentator has
taken the view that "Commerce Clause litigation [like Harvey] may change the very
structure of the solid waste industry and perhaps effectively eliminate the ability of
local government to plan for their solid waste needs." Id. at 801.
240. For a discussion of the problems which have plagued municipalities and
counties in their efforts to provide adequate waste disposal facilities, see supra
notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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effects on communities as well. 2 41 Because of these effects, commu-

nities will have to examine other options to deal with the existing
problem of overcrowded and environmentally unsound waste disposal facilities. Additionally, legal efforts will result in increased administrative costs. Legal alternatives may prove to be more costly
than the plans which the Harvey court put into question. Further,
alternative legal maneuvering to avoid Commerce Clause liability is
not guaranteed to survive constitutional scrutiny in the future, and
these alternative methods may prove to be as controversial and expensive as legal flow control plans. 242 This creates a vicious cycle

that will simply delay the effective treatment of waste, which will in
turn increase costs, and thereafter increase the negative environmental impacts of delaying effective treatment.
Finally, negative social and environmental effects will be the
product of Harvey and other similar cases which have cast substan241. See Flow Control Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 2227 Before the Subcomm. on
Superfund, Recycling and Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on Env't and
Public Works, 103d. Cong. 1-87 (1994) [hereinafter Flow Control Act Senate Hearing].
The invalidation of flow control measures in cases like Carbone,does the following:
[P]uts existing bonds used to finance waste management facilities at significant risk. If localities cannot send an adequate level of trash to a facility to generate the revenue needed to pay off the bonds, obviously they
face default and citizens in the affected communities face the possibility
of ever increasing high taxes.

Id. at 2. Alternatively stated:
After the Supreme Court decision in Carbone, Moody's Investor Service
investigated the economic effect of the loss of flow control and found
that landfills and waste-to-energy facilities were losing revenue, and municipalities were having trouble selling bonds to finance facilities.
Moody's investigation included a review of the bond ratings of 100 solid
waste facilities dependent upon flow control. ByJune 1995, after analyzing the facilities with a total debt of $4.5 billion dollars, Moody's downgraded the bonds of 14 solid waste management authorities, confirmed
62, and upgraded none. Moreover, it determined that three-fourths of
the 76 ratings reviewed had an unfavorable rating outlook due mostly to
the potential loss of flow control. Of particular note, Moody's downgraded the waste bond rating of five New Jersey counties to below investment grade status, which is tantamount to labeling them junk bonds.
Wolf, CongressionalBailout, supra note 13, at 270.
Similarly, flow control invalidation means that "[t]axpayers are going to be
forced to pick up the tab to pay for the deficits run by public facilities that no
longer receive sufficient waste flow to pay for them." Flow Control Act Senate Hearing,
supra, at 5 (statement of Sen. Faircloth). Senator Duremberger reiterated the
large negative economic effects that flow control invalidation creates when he
stated that "[t]oday there are billions of State and local dollars at stake because of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Carbone. In my State of Minnesota alone,
that amount of debt stands at $325 million; nationwide, it is as high as $18 billion."
Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Duremberger).
242. For a discussion of the legal and constitutional problems facing alternatives to legal flow control, see supra notes 191-238 and accompanying text.
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tial doubt over the constitutionality of legal flow control. 243 Citizens of municipalities and counties that are unable to establish
timely and effective waste processing and disposal plans will be negatively affected because of increased environmental risks, their attendant health problems and potential increased municipal taxes
and reduction of services. 244 It is readily apparent that the social
atmosphere of every citizen can potentially be altered by the Harvey
decision and the invalidation of flow control measures.
Erik T. Koons
243. See id. (explaining legal and constitutional problems facing alternative
methods for flow control). For a discussion of the effects of flow control invalidation on municipal recycling efforts, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
244. For example, Mr. Randy Johnson, the Commissioner of Hennepin
County, Minnesota, and the Third Vice-President of the National Association of
Counties, stated that effective waste management and compliance with RCRA was
difficult without Congress explicitly authorizing flow controlling waste. See Interstate Transportation,supranote 4, at 107. He continued to state that "[s]afe disposal
facilities . . . are a part of the basic infrastructure of our communities" and that
"[w]ithout them, economic development cannot occur and health and safety cannot be guaranteed." Id.
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